

The Iraq Wars And Americas Military Revolution

This book analyzes American war propaganda, beginning with the Spanish-American War and extending through the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Using Fisher's narrative paradigm, the author identifies and critically evaluates recurring war stories, determining whether or not they truly provided good reasons to go to war.

An Arab-American journalist looks at the Iraq War from the perspective of ordinary Iraqi citizens confronted by the dislocations, hardships, tragedies, and harsh realities of the conflict.

A prominent national security analyst provides a critical examination of the origins, objectives, conduct, and consequences of the U.S. war against Iraq in this major new study. Focusing on the intersection of world politics, U.S. foreign policy, and the invasion and occupation of Iraq, Jeffrey Record presents a full-scale policy analysis of the war and its aftermath. As he looks at the political and strategic legacies of the 1991 Gulf War, the impact of 9/11 and neo-conservative ideology on the George W. Bush White House, and the formulation of the Bush Doctrine on the use of force, he assesses rather than describes, judges rather than recites facts. He decries the Bush administration's threat conflation of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, and calls U.S. plans inadequate to meet postwar challenges in Iraq. With the support of convincing evidence, the author concludes that America's war against Iraq was both unnecessary and damaging to long-term U.S. security interests. He argues that there was no threatening Saddam-Osama connection and that even if Iraq had the weapons of mass destruction that the Bush administration believed necessitated war, it could have been readily deterred from using them, just as it had been in 1991. Record faults the administration for preventive, unilateralist policies that alienated friends and allies, weakened international institutions important to the United States, and saddled America with costly, open-ended occupation of an Arab heartland. He contends that far from being a major victory against terrorism, the war provided Islamic jihadists an expanded recruiting base and a new front of operations against Americans. Such a solid, thought-provoking study merits attention.

This book is a comprehensive study of the Iraq Wars in the context of the revolution in military affairs debate.

A bold and urgent perspective on how American foreign policy must change in response to the shifting world order of the twenty-first century, from the New York Times bestselling author of *The Limits of Power* and *The Age of Illusions*. The purpose of U.S. foreign policy has, at least theoretically, been to keep Americans safe. Yet as we confront a radically changed world, it has become indisputably clear that the terms of that policy have failed. Washington's insistence that a market economy is compatible with the common good, its faith in the idea of the "West" and its "special relationships," its conviction that global military primacy is the key to a stable and sustainable world order—these have brought endless wars and a succession of moral and material disasters. In a bold reconception of America's place in the world, informed by thinking from across the political spectrum, Andrew J. Bacevich—founder and president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a bipartisan Washington think tank dedicated to foreign policy—lays down a new approach—one that is based on moral pragmatism, mutual coexistence, and war as a last resort. Confronting the threats of the future—accelerating climate change, a shift in the international balance of power, and the ascendance of information technology over brute weapons of war—his vision calls for nothing less than a profound overhaul of our understanding of national security. Crucial and provocative, *After the Apocalypse* sets out new principles to guide the once-but-no-longer sole superpower as it navigates a transformed world.

Finalist for the Pulitzer Prize • One of the Washington Post Book World's 10 Best Books of the Year • Time's 10 Best Books of the Year • USA Today's Nonfiction Book of the Year • A New York Times Notable Book "Staggeringly vivid and persuasive . . . absolutely essential reading." —Michiko Kakutani, *The New York Times* "The best account yet of the entire war." —Vanity Fair The definitive account of the American military's tragic experience in Iraq Fiasco is a masterful reckoning with the planning and execution of the American military invasion and occupation of Iraq through mid-2006, now with a postscript on recent developments. Ricks draws on the exclusive cooperation of an extraordinary number of American personnel, including more than one hundred senior officers, and access to more than 30,000 pages of official documents, many of them never before made public. Tragically, it is an undeniable account—explosive, shocking, and authoritative—of unsurpassed tactical success combined with unsurpassed strategic failure that indicts some of America's most powerful and honored civilian and military leaders.

A founder of a leading private intelligence company offers a geopolitical, inside analysis of the truth about America's true foreign policy in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations around the world, examining covert and overt efforts in the global war against terrorism, the unreported factors that led to the invasion of Iraq, and other important events. Reprint. 20,000 first printing.

A thorough analysis of where U.S./European relations have gone wrong--and how to set them right ALLIES AT WAR is the first and most comprehensive assessment of what went wrong between America and Europe during the crisis over Iraq and is based on extensive interviews with policymakers in the United States and Europe. It puts the crisis over Iraq in historical context by examining US-Europe relations since World War II and shows how the alliance traditionally managed to overcome its many internal difficulties and crises. It describes how the deep strategic differences that emerged at the end of the Cold War and the disputes over the Balkans and the Middle East during the Clinton years already had some analysts questioning whether the Alliance could survive. It shows how the Bush administration's unilateral diplomacy and world-view helped bring

already simmering tensions to a boil, and describes in depth the events leading up to the Iraq crisis of 2003. Gordon and Shapiro explain how powerful forces such as rising American power and the September 11 terrorist attacks have made relations between America and Europe increasingly difficult. But the authors argue that the split over Iraq was not inevitable: it was the result of misguided decisions and unnecessary provocations on both sides. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that claims that the Iraq war signaled the effective end of the Atlantic Alliance, the authors warn that assuming the end of the Alliance could quickly become a self-fulfilling prophecy: leaving the United States isolated, resented, and responsible for bearing the burdens of maintaining international security largely alone. In response to those who argue that the Atlantic Alliance is no longer viable or necessary, *ALLIES AT WAR* demonstrates that even after Iraq, the United States and Europe can work together, and indeed must if they wish to effectively address the most pressing problems of our age. The book makes concrete proposals for restoring transatlantic relations and updating the alliance to meet new challenges like global terrorism and the transformation of an unstable Middle East.

The United States national-security establishment is vast, yet the United States has failed to meet its initial objectives in almost every one of its major, post-World War II conflicts. Of these troubled efforts, the US wars in Vietnam (1965-73), Iraq (2003-11), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and miscalculated decisions. Because overarching policy goals are distant and open to interpretation, policymakers ground their decisions in the immediate world of short-term objectives, salient tasks, policy constraints, and fixed time schedules. As a consequence, they exaggerate the benefits of their preferred policies, ignore the accompanying costs and requirements, and underappreciate the benefits of alternatives. In *Planning to Fail*, James H. Lebovic argues that a profound myopia helps explain US decision-making failures. In each of the wars explored in this book, he identifies four stages of intervention. First and foremost, policymakers chose unwisely to go to war. After the fighting began, they inadvisably sought to extend or expand the mission. Next, they pursued the mission, in abbreviated form, to suboptimal effect. Finally, they adapted the mission to exit from the conflict. Lebovic argues that US leaders were effectively planning to fail whatever their hopes and thoughts were at the time the intervention began. Decision-makers struggled less than they should have, even when conditions allowed for good choices. Then, when conditions on the ground left them with only bad choices, they struggled furiously and more than could ever matter. Policymakers allowed these wars to sap available capabilities, push US forces to the breaking point, and exhaust public support. They finally settled for terms of departure that they (or their predecessors) would have rejected at the start of these conflicts. Offering a far-ranging and detailed analysis, this book identifies an unmistakable pattern of failure and highlights lessons we can learn from it.

Provides current information on the Iraq War, discussing causes, costs, problems, and the aftermath.

A Pretext for War reveals the systematic weaknesses behind the failure to detect or prevent the 9/11 attacks, and details the Bush administration's subsequent misuse of intelligence to sell preemptive war to the American people. Filled with unprecedented revelations, from the sites of "undisclosed locations" to the actual sources of America's Middle East policy, *A Pretext for War* is essential reading for anyone concerned about the security of the United States. Acclaimed author James Bamford—whose classic book *The Puzzle Palace* first revealed the existence of the National Security Agency—draws on his unparalleled access to top intelligence sources to produce a devastating expose of the intelligence community and the Bush administration.

In the autumn of 2002, *Atlantic Monthly* national correspondent James Fallows wrote an article predicting many of the problems America would face if it invaded Iraq. After events confirmed many of his predictions, Fallows went on to write some of the most acclaimed, award-winning journalism on the planning and execution of the war, much of which has been assigned as required reading within the U.S. military. In *Blind Into Baghdad*, Fallows takes us from the planning of the war through the struggles of reconstruction. With unparalleled access and incisive analysis, he shows us how many of the difficulties were anticipated by experts whom the administration ignored. Fallows examines how the war in Iraq undercut the larger "war on terror" and why Iraq still had no army two years after the invasion. In a sobering conclusion, he interviews soldiers, spies, and diplomats to imagine how a war in Iran might play out. This is an important and essential book to understand where and how the war went wrong, and what it means for America.

LONGLISTED FOR THE NATIONAL BOOK AWARD • A searing reassessment of U.S. military policy in the Middle East over the past four decades from retired army colonel and *New York Times* bestselling author Andrew J. Bacevich, with a new afterword by the author From the end of World War II until 1980, virtually no American soldiers were killed in action while serving in the Greater Middle East. Since 1990, virtually no American soldiers have been killed in action anywhere else. What caused this shift? Andrew J. Bacevich, one of the country's most respected voices on foreign affairs, offers an incisive critical history of this ongoing military enterprise—now more than thirty years old and with no end in sight. During the 1980s, Bacevich argues, a great transition occurred. As the Cold War wound down, the United States initiated a new conflict—a War for the Greater Middle East—that continues to the present day. The long twilight struggle with the Soviet Union had involved only occasional and sporadic fighting. But as this new war unfolded, hostilities became persistent. From the Balkans and East Africa to the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, U.S. forces embarked upon a seemingly endless series of campaigns across the Islamic world. Few achieved anything remotely like conclusive success. Instead, actions undertaken with expectations of promoting peace and stability produced just the opposite. As a consequence, phrases like "permanent war" and "open-ended war" have become part of everyday discourse. Connecting the dots in a way no other historian has done before, Bacevich weaves a compelling narrative out of episodes as varied as the Beirut bombing of 1983, the Mogadishu firefight of 1993, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the rise of ISIS in the present decade. Understanding what America's costly military exertions have wrought requires seeing these seemingly discrete events as parts of a

single war. It also requires identifying the errors of judgment made by political leaders in both parties and by senior military officers who share responsibility for what has become a monumental march to folly. This Bacevich unflinchingly does. A twenty-year army veteran who served in Vietnam, Andrew J. Bacevich brings the full weight of his expertise to this vitally important subject. America's War for the Greater Middle East is a bracing after-action report from the front lines of history. It will fundamentally change the way we view America's engagement in the world's most volatile region. Praise for America's War for the Greater Middle East "Bacevich is thought-provoking, profane and fearless. . . . [His] call for Americans to rethink their nation's militarized approach to the Middle East is incisive, urgent and essential."—The New York Times Book Review "Bacevich's magnum opus . . . a deft and rhythmic polemic aimed at America's failures in the Middle East from the end of Jimmy Carter's presidency to the present."—Robert D. Kaplan, The Wall Street Journal "A critical review of American policy and military involvement . . . Those familiar with Bacevich's work will recognize the clarity of expression, the devastating directness and the coruscating wit that characterize the writing of one of the most articulate and incisive living critics of American foreign policy."—The Washington Post "[A] monumental new work."—The Huffington Post "An unparalleled historical tour de force certain to affect the formation of future U.S. foreign policy."—Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)

The invasion of Iraq by American, British and other coalition forces has indeed transformed the Middle East, but not as the Bush and Blair administrations had imagined. It is Iran, not Western-style democracy, that has emerged as the big winner, creating a Tehran-Baghdad axis that would have been unthinkable before the war. THE END OF IRAQ is the definitive account of the US and UK's catastrophic involvement in Iraq, as told by America's leading independent expert on the country. Peter Galbraith reveals in exquisite detail how US policies -- some going back to the Reagan administration -- have now produced a nearly independent Kurdistan in the north, an Islamic state in the south, and uncontrollable insurgency in the centre, and an incipient Sunni-Shiite civil war that has Baghdad as its central front. Iraq, Galbraith argues, cannot be reconstructed as a single state. Instead, a sensible strategy must accept that it has already broken up and focus instead on stopping an escalating civil war. Unflinching, accessible and powerful, THE END OF IRAQ explores and explains the myriad mistakes and false assumptions that have brought the country to its current pass, and what must be done to prevent further bloodshed.

Counter Jihad provides a sweeping account of America's military campaigns in the Islamic world and fills a gaping void in our understanding of the War on Terror.

Choice Outstanding Academic Title of 2016 Investigates the causes, conduct, and consequences of the recent American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Understanding the United States' wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is essential to understanding the United States in the first decade of the new millennium and beyond. These wars were pivotal to American foreign policy and international relations. They were expensive: in lives, in treasure, and in reputation. They raised critical ethical and legal questions; they provoked debates over policy, strategy, and war-planning; they helped to shape American domestic politics. And they highlighted a profound division among the American people: While more than two million Americans served in Iraq and Afghanistan, many in multiple deployments, the vast majority of Americans and their families remained untouched by and frequently barely aware of the wars conducted in their name, far from American shores, in regions about which they know little. Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan gives us the first book-length expert historical analysis of these wars. It shows us how they began, what they teach us about the limits of the American military and diplomacy, and who fought them. It examines the lessons and legacies of wars whose outcomes may not be clear for decades. In 1945 few Americans could imagine that the country would be locked in a Cold War with the Soviet Union for decades; fewer could imagine how history would paint the era. Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan begins to come to grips with the period when America became enmeshed in a succession of "low intensity" conflicts in the Middle East.

"Essential . . . one for the ages . . . a must read for all who care about presidential power." —The Washington Post "Authoritative . . . The most comprehensive account yet of that smoldering wreck of foreign policy, one that haunts us today." —LA Times One of BookPage's Best Books of 2020 To Start a War paints a vivid and indelible picture of a decision-making process that was fatally compromised by a combination of post-9/11 fear and paranoia, rank naïveté, craven groupthink, and a set of actors with idées fixes who gamed the process relentlessly. Everything was believed; nothing was true. Robert Draper's fair-mindedness and deep understanding of the principal actors suffuse his account, as does a storytelling genius that is close to sorcery. There are no cheap shots here, which makes the ultimate conclusion all the more damning. In the spirit of Barbara W.

Tuchman's The Guns of August and Marc Bloch's Strange Defeat, To Start A War will stand as the definitive account of a collective scurrying for evidence that would prove to be not just dubious but entirely false—evidence that was then used to justify a verdict that led to hundreds of thousands of deaths and a flood tide of chaos in the Middle East that shows no signs of ebbing.

This ground-breaking work explores the lives of average soldiers from the American Revolution through the 21st-century conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. • Provides readers with an understanding of the daily lives of soldiers in America's wars, greatly complementing more standard histories of battles and leaders • Offers a curated collection of primary sources for each conflict that illuminates the daily lives of US soldiers during wartime • Includes detailed bibliographies that offer many accessible sources needed by students and researchers looking to further explore the topics • Provides a comprehensive chronology for each conflict that helps readers to place it within the proper historical context • Spans nearly 250 years of national history from the American Revolution to the Afghanistan War

Rather and the reporters of CBS News provide a unique historical record of military conflict from a riveting vantage point--alongside the brave soldiers on the frontlines of combat.

America's Destruction of Iraq by Washington insider Michael M. O'Brien details the origins of radical Islamic terrorism now spreading across the Middle East and North Africa. The outgrowth of America's involvement in Iraq, culminating with its March 2003 invasion, is the Islamic State—the most violent terrorist organization in history. Michael O'Brien is an outlier: a conservative and former political appointee in the administration of George W. Bush, with an abiding contempt for the political and military mismanagement of the Iraq War, officially referred to as Operation Iraqi Freedom. A graduate of West Point and former Infantry officer, and a former U.S. government Contracting Officer, O'Brien saw the effects of the Iraq invasion from the inside out—not as a soldier but as a contractor advising the new Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense on its physical infrastructure, including the acquisition of land and Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) originally built for Coalition forces. Compounding in outrage, compelling in detail, Michael O'Brien condemns the waste of tens of billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars, and the needless loss of American and Iraqi lives. The Bush administration's desire for war was built on fabricated intelligence and the political agendas of a handful of senior officials. But it is the senior American military for whom O'Brien has his greatest disdain. They should have known how to properly execute the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and the courage to tell their political superiors what it would take to succeed, come what may to their careers. America's Destruction of Iraq is a detailed expose of the "military-industrial complex" President Eisenhower warned America of in 1961. Only someone with Michael O'Brien's background and experience, who was at the heart of America's so-called 'reconstruction' of Iraq, can accurately describe America's intervention in Iraq for what it is: a disaster in magnitude equal to the quagmire of the Vietnam War."

Two young U.S. Army officers are trying to do their duty in Iraq playing whack-a-mole with at least seven fanatical insurgent groups in the aftermath of the American invasion. Both officers serve in the Big Red One, the vaunted 1st Infantry Division. First Lieutenant Nathan Petty is stationed close to the flagpole, where he quickly learns that the situation in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq is as confusing to those who wear stars as it is to their men out on the point of the bayonet. The other, First Lieutenant Christian Winn, leads a platoon of Wolfhounds, young soldiers struggling to understand the situation and their place in it as they patrol the mean streets of a Northern Iraqi city infested with tribes, factions, and shooters who just want to kill Americans. Through their mutual support and experience with the real essence of ground combat—kill or be killed and politics be damned—they lead from the front, desperately trying to help their soldiers stay motivated and alive. The Wolfhounds, like the rest of the American Army, struggle to deal with a growing insurgency and the insurgents' weapon of choice, improvised explosive devices or IEDs. As the platoon is visiting a school construction project, a sniper's bullet sends the Wolfhounds on a days-long pursuit. Placed squarely in the American tradition of war writing such as Kevin Power's *The Yellow Birds* and John Renehan's *The Valley*, Schmid's *Princes of War* takes its protagonists into the real Iraq: Where the enemy is elusive and danger stalks constantly. Human emotions as old as time—ambition, courage, doubt, fear—churn inside each soldier as they search for the sniper. Some men falter, some fail, and some demonstrate extraordinary courage. "From the authentic dialogue of Soldiers fighting in a forgotten war zone, to a very tightly wound plot that causes the pages to pass furiously and imperceptibly, *PRINCES OF WAR* is an extraordinary tale that will remain with you, seared in your memory long after you turn the last page." – John Fenzel, author of *The Sterling Forest*

The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution Cambridge University Press

Many saw the United States' decisive victory in Desert Storm (1991) as not only vindication of American defense policy since Vietnam but also confirmation of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Just as information-age technologies were revolutionizing civilian life, the Gulf War appeared to reflect similarly profound changes in warfare. A debate has raged ever since about a contemporary RMA and its implications for American defense policy. Addressing these issues, *The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution* is a comprehensive study of the Iraq Wars in the context of the RMA debate. Focusing on the creation of a reconnaissance-strike complex and conceptions of parallel or nonlinear warfare, Keith L. Shimko finds a persuasive case for a contemporary RMA while recognizing its limitations as well as promise.

A three-star general offers an insider account of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, explaining how garbled intelligence, poor decision making, and no clear understanding of the enemy resulted in the failure of both missions.

Collateral Damage brings together testimony from the largest number of on the record, named, combat veterans who reveal the disturbing, daily reality of war and occupation in Iraq. Through their eyes, we learn how the mechanics of war lead to the abuse and frequent killing of innocents. They describe convoys of vehicles roaring down roads, smashing into cars, and hitting Iraqi civilians. They detail raids that leave families shot dead in the mayhem. And they describe a battlefield in which troops, untrained to distinguish between combatants and civilians, are authorized to shoot whenever they feel threatened. "A well researched and well analyzed study of the nature of insurgencies and guerilla warfare" (*Military Review*). The fighting skills and valor of the US military and its allies haven't diminished over the past half-century—yet our wars have become more protracted and decisive results more elusive. With only two exceptions—Panama and the Gulf War under the first President Bush—our campaigns have taken on the character of endless slogs without positive results. This fascinating book takes a ground-up look at the problem to assess how our strategic objectives have become divorced from our true capability or imperatives. The book presents a unique examination of the nature of insurgencies and the three major guerrilla wars the United States has fought in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. It is both a theoretical work and one that applies the hard experience of the past five decades to address the issues of today. As such, it also provides a timely and meaningful discussion of America's current geopolitical position. It starts with the previously close-held casualty estimate for Iraq that The Dupuy Institute compiled in 2004 for the US Department of Defense. Going from the practical to the theoretical, it then discusses a construct for understanding insurgencies and the contexts in which they can be fought. It applies these principles to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam, assessing where the projection of US power can enhance our position and where it merely weakens it. It presents an extensive analysis of insurgencies based upon a unique database of eighty-three post-WWII cases. The book explores what is important to combat and what is not important to resist in insurgencies. It builds a body of knowledge, based upon a half-century's worth of real-world data, with analysis, not opinion. In these pages, Christopher A. Lawrence, the President of The Dupuy Institute, provides an invaluable guide to how the US can best project its vital power while avoiding the missteps of the recent past. "Provides a unique quantitative historical analysis. . . Logically estimating the outcomes of future military operations, as the author writes, is what US citizens should expect and demand from their leaders who take this country to war." —*Military Review*

At once a grand tour of the battlefields of North America and an unabashedly personal tribute to the military prowess of an essentially unwarlike people, *Fields of Battle* spans more than two centuries and the expanse of a continent to show how the immense spaces of North America shaped the wars that were fought on its soil. of photos.

Shifts in public opinion have had an impact on U.S. foreign policy

When should the United States go to war? It is arguably the most important foreign policy question facing any president, and Richard Haass -- a member of the National Security Council staff for the first President Bush and the director of policy planning in the State Department for Bush II -- is in a unique position to address it. Haass is one of just a handful of individuals -- along with Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Bob Gates -- involved at a senior level of U.S. government decision making during both Iraq conflicts. He is the first to take us behind closed doors and the first to provide a personal account. The result is a book that is authoritative, revealing, and surprising. Haass

explains not only what happened but why. At first blush, the two Iraq wars appear similar. Both involved a President George Bush and the United States in conflicts with Saddam Hussein and Iraq. There, however, the resemblance ends. Haass contrasts the decisions that shaped the conduct of the two wars and makes a crucial distinction between the 1991 and 2003 conflicts. The first Iraq war, following Saddam Hussein's invasion of neighboring Kuwait, was a war of necessity. It was limited in ambition, well executed, and carried out with unprecedented international support. By contrast, the second Iraq war was one of choice, the most significant discretionary war undertaken by the United States since Vietnam. Haass argues that it was unwarranted, as the United States had other viable policy options. Making matters worse was the fact that this ambitious undertaking was poorly implemented and fought with considerably more international opposition than backing. These are the principal conclusions of this compelling, honest, and challenging book by one of this country's most respected voices on foreign policy. Haass's assessments are critical yet fair -- and carry tremendous weight. He offers a thoughtful examination of the means and ends of U.S. foreign policy: how it should be made, what it should seek to accomplish, and how it should be pursued. *War of Necessity, War of Choice* -- part history, part memoir -- provides invaluable insight into some of the most important recent events in the world. It also provides a much-needed compass for how the United States can apply the lessons learned from the two Iraq wars so that it is better positioned to put into practice what worked and to avoid repeating what so clearly did not. The dramatic insider account of why we invaded Iraq, the motivations that drove it, and the frustrations of those who tried and failed to stop it, leading to the most costly misadventure in US history. A single disastrous choice in the wake of 9/11--the decision to use force to remove Saddam Hussein from power--did enormous damage to the wealth, well-being, and reputation of the United States. Few errors in U.S. foreign policy have had longer-lasting or more harmful consequences. Yet how the decision came to be made remains shrouded in mystery and mythology. To this day, even the principal architects of the war cannot agree on it. Michael Mazarr has interviewed dozens of players involved in the deliberations about the invasion of Iraq and has reviewed all the documents so far declassified. He paints a devastating portrait of an administration fueled by righteous conviction yet undercut by chaotic processes, rivalrous agencies, and competing egos. But more than the product of one bungling administration, the invasion of Iraq emerges here as a tragically typical example of modern U.S. foreign policy fiascos. *Leap of Faith* asks profound questions about the limits of US power and the accountability for its use. It offers lessons urgently relevant to stave off similar disasters--today and in the future.

Why have the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq lasted longer than any others in American history? The conventional wisdom suggests that the move to an all-volunteer force and unmanned technologies such as drones have reduced the apparent burden of war so much that they have allowed these conflicts to continue almost unnoticed for years. *Taxing Wars* suggests that the burden in blood is just one side of the coin. The way Americans bear the burden in treasure has also changed, and these changes have both eroded accountability and contributed to the phenomenon of perpetual war. Sarah Kreps chronicles the entire history of how America has paid for its wars--and how its methods have changed. Early on, the United States imposed war taxes that both demanded sacrifices from all Americans and served as reminders of their participation. Indeed, thinkers from Immanuel Kant to Adam Smith argued that these reminders were exactly the reason why democracies tended to fight shorter and less costly wars. Bearing these burdens caused the populace to sue for peace when the costs mounted. Leaders in a democracy, responsive to their citizens, would have incentives to heed that opposition and bring wars to as expeditious an end as possible. Since the Korean War, the United States has increasingly moved away from war taxes. Instead, borrowing--and its comparatively less visible connection with the war--has become a permanent feature of contemporary wars. The move serves leaders well because reducing the apparent burden of war has helped mute public opposition and any decision-making constraints. But by masking accountability, however, the move away from war taxes undermines the basis for democratic restraint in wartime. Contemporary wars have become correspondingly longer and costlier as the public has become disconnected from those burdens. Given the trends identified in *Taxing Wars*, the recent past--epitomized by our lengthy wars in Afghanistan and Iraq--is likely to be prologue.

A critical assessment of America's foreign policy in the Middle East throughout the past four decades evaluates and connects regional engagements since 1990 while revealing their massive costs.

What wasn't learned from a U.S. intervention that succeeded In July 1958, U.S. Marines stormed the beach in Beirut, Lebanon, ready for combat. They were greeted by vendors and sunbathers. Fortunately, the rest of their mission--helping to end Lebanon's first civil war--went nearly as smoothly and successfully, thanks in large part to the skillful work of American diplomats who helped arrange a compromise solution. Future American interventions in the region would not work out quite as well. Bruce Riedel's new book tells the now-forgotten story (forgotten, that is, in the United States) of the first U.S. combat operation in the Middle East. President Eisenhower sent the Marines in the wake of a bloody coup in Iraq, a seismic event that altered politics not only of that country but eventually of the entire region. Eisenhower feared that the coup, along with other conspiracies and events that seemed mysterious back in Washington, threatened American interests in the Middle East. His action, and those of others, were driven in large part by a cast of fascinating characters whose espionage and covert actions could be grist for a movie. Although Eisenhower's intervention in Lebanon was unique, certainly in its relatively benign outcome, it does hold important lessons for today's policymakers as they seek to deal with the always unexpected challenges in the Middle East. Veteran analyst Bruce Reidel describes the scene as it emerged six decades ago, and he suggests that some of the lessons learned then are still valid today. A key lesson? Not to rush to judgment when surprised by the unexpected. And don't assume the worst.

Americans are greatly concerned about the number of our troops killed in battle--100,000 dead in World War I; 300,000 in World War II; 33,000 in the Korean War; 58,000 in

Vietnam; 4,500 in Iraq; over 1,000 in Afghanistan--and rightly so. But why are we so indifferent, often oblivious, to the far greater number of casualties suffered by those we fight and those we fight for? This is the compelling, largely unasked question John Tirman answers in *The Deaths of Others*. Between six and seven million people died in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq alone, the majority of them civilians. And yet Americans devote little attention to these deaths. Other countries, however, do pay attention, and Tirman argues that if we want to understand why there is so much anti-Americanism around the world, the first place to look is how we conduct war. We understandably strive to protect our own troops, but our rules of engagement with the enemy are another matter. From atomic weapons and carpet bombing in World War II to napalm and daisy cutters in Vietnam and beyond, we have used our weapons intentionally to kill large numbers of civilians and terrorize our adversaries into surrender. Americans, however, are mostly ignorant of these facts, believing that American wars are essentially just, necessary, and "good." Tirman investigates the history of casualties caused by American forces in order to explain why America remains so unpopular and why US armed forces operate the way they do. Trenchant and passionate, *The Deaths of Others* forces readers to consider the tragic consequences of American military action not just for Americans, but especially for those we fight.

Several "pieces first published in *The New Yorker* recall the path terror in the Middle East has taken from the rise of al-Qaeda in the 1990s to the recent beheadings of reporters and aid workers by ISIS ... They include an ... impression of Saudi Arabia, a kingdom of silence under the control of the religious police; the Syrian film industry, then compliant at the edges but already exuding a feeling of the barely masked fury that erupted into civil war; [and] the 2006-11 Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza, a study in disparate values of human lives. Others continue to look into al-Qaeda as it forms a master plan for its future, experiences a rebellion from within the organization, and spins off a growing web of terror in the world"--

"A skeptical appraisal of U.S. military intervention in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Iraq, highlighting a common pattern of poor intelligence gathering, nationalistic hubris, and political pressures, which led to these unsuccessful foreign adventures"--

Nir Rosen's *Aftermath*, an extraordinary feat of reporting, follows the contagious spread of radicalism and sectarian violence that the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the ensuing civil war have unleashed in the Muslim world. Rosen—who the *Weekly Standard* once bitterly complained has “great access to the Baathists and jihadists who make up the Iraqi insurgency”—has spent nearly a decade among warriors and militants who have been challenging American power in the Muslim world. In *Aftermath*, he tells their story, showing the other side of the U.S. war on terror, traveling from the battle-scarred streets of Baghdad to the alleys, villages, refugee camps, mosques, and killing grounds of Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and finally Afghanistan, where Rosen has a terrifying encounter with the Taliban as their “guest,” and witnesses the new Obama surge fizzling in southern Afghanistan. Rosen was one of the few Westerners to venture inside the mosques of Baghdad to witness the first stirrings of sectarian hatred in the months after the U.S. invasion. He shows how weapons, tactics, and sectarian ideas from the civil war in Iraq penetrated neighboring countries and threatened their stability, especially Lebanon and Jordan, where new jihadist groups mushroomed. Moreover, he shows that the spread of violence at the street level is often the consequence of specific policies hatched in Washington, D.C. Rosen offers a seminal and provocative account of the surge, told from the perspective of U.S. troops on the ground, the Iraqi security forces, Shiite militias and Sunni insurgents that were both allies and adversaries. He also tells the story of what happened to these militias once they outlived their usefulness to the Americans. *Aftermath* is both a unique personal history and an unsparing account of what America has wrought in Iraq and the region. The result is a hair-raising, 360-degree view of the modern battlefield its consequent humanitarian catastrophe, and the reality of counterinsurgency.

Discusses how media have "packaged" the war in Iraq [2003], exploring the way the media have presented the war by telling human interest stories, supporting public policies, and crafting a narrative that supports the war. From publisher description.

"Many saw the United States' decisive victory in Desert Storm (1991) as not only vindication of American defense policy since Vietnam but also confirmation of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Just as information-age technologies were revolutionizing civilian life, the Gulf War appeared to reflect similarly profound changes in warfare. A debate has raged ever since about a contemporary RMA and its implications for American defense policy. Addressing these issues, *The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution* is a comprehensive study of the Iraq Wars in the context of the RMA debate. Focusing on the creation of a reconnaissance-strike complex and conceptions of parallel or nonlinear warfare, Keith L. Shimko finds a persuasive case for a contemporary RMA while recognizing its limitations as well as promise"-

The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon's invasion of Russia to America's invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. *Blunders, Blunders, and Wars* analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case.

On the evening of September 11, 2002, with the Statue of Liberty shimmering in the background, television cameras captured President George W. Bush as he advocated the charge for war against Iraq. This carefully staged performance, writes Susan Brewer, was the culmination of a long tradition of sophisticated wartime propaganda in America. In *Why America Fights*, Brewer offers a fascinating history of how successive presidents have conducted what Donald Rumsfeld calls "perception management," from McKinley's war in the Philippines to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Her intriguing account ranges from analyses of wartime messages to descriptions of the actual operations, from the dissemination of patriotic ads and posters to the management of newspaper, radio, and TV media. When Woodrow Wilson carried the nation into World War I, he created the Committee on Public Information, led by George Creel, who called his job "the world's greatest adventure in advertising." In World War II, Roosevelt's Office of War Information avowed a "strategy of truth," though government propaganda still depicted Japanese soldiers as buck-toothed savages. After examining the ultimately failed struggle to cast the Vietnam War in a favorable light, Brewer shows how the Bush White House drew explicit lessons from that history as it engaged in an unprecedented effort to sell a preemptive war in Iraq. Yet the thrust of its message was not much different from McKinley's pronouncements about America's civilizing mission. Impressively researched and argued, filled with surprising details, *Why America Fights* shows how presidents have consistently drummed up support for foreign wars by appealing to what Americans want to believe about themselves.

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