

Robert Jervis Perception And Misperception Bayanbox

Discusses the way leaders deal with risk in making foreign policy decisions

With a new preface by the author Since its original publication in 1976, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* has become a landmark book in its field, hailed by the *New York Times* as "the seminal statement of principles underlying political psychology." This new edition includes an extensive preface by the author reflecting on the book's lasting impact and legacy, particularly in the application of cognitive psychology to political decision making, and brings that analysis up to date by discussing the relevant psychological research over the past forty years. Jervis describes the process of perception (for example, how decision makers learn from history) and then explores common forms of misperception (such as overestimating one's influence). He then tests his ideas through a number of important events in international relations from nineteenth- and twentieth-century European history. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* is essential for understanding international relations today. Donald Trump's election has called into question many fundamental assumptions about politics and society. Should the forty-fifth president of the United States make us reconsider the nature and future of the global order? Collecting a wide range of perspectives from leading political scientists, historians, and international-relations scholars, *Chaos in the Liberal Order* explores the global trends that led to Trump's stunning victory and the impact his presidency will have on the international political landscape. Contributors situate Trump among past foreign policy upheavals and enduring models for global governance, seeking to understand how and why he departs from precedents and norms. The book considers key issues, such as what Trump means for America's role in the world; the relationship between domestic and international politics; and Trump's place in the rise of the far right worldwide. It poses challenging questions, including: Does Trump's election signal the downfall of the liberal order or unveil its resilience? What is the importance of individual leaders for the international system, and to what extent is Trump an outlier? Is there a Trump doctrine, or is America's president fundamentally impulsive and scattershot? The book considers the effects of Trump's presidency on trends in human rights, international alliances, and regional conflicts. With provocative contributions from prominent figures such as Stephen M. Walt, Andrew J. Bacevich, and Samuel Moyn, this timely collection brings much-needed expert perspectives on our tumultuous era.

Perception and Misperception in International Politics Princeton University Press

MySearchLab provides students with a complete understanding of the research process so they can complete research projects confidently and efficiently. Students and instructors with an internet connection can visit www.MySearchLab.com and receive immediate access to thousands of full articles from the EBSCO ContentSelect database. In addition, MySearchLab offers extensive content on the research process itself--including tips on how to navigate and maximize time in the campus library, a step-by-step guide on writing a research paper, and instructions on how to finish an academic assignment with endnotes and bibliography.- Edited by two of the most respected international relations scholars, "International Politics" places contemporary essays alongside classics to survey the field's diverse voices, concepts, and issues. Challenging students to use original scholarship to recognize and analyze patterns in world politics, this bestselling reader considers how to effectively understand politics under governments and beyond. Carefully edited selections cover the most essential topics and are put into conversation with each other to illustrate fundamental debates and differing points of view. Comprehensive and engaging, "International Politics" offers the best overview of the discipline as well as the forces shaping the world today.

The idea that war is going out of style has become the conventional wisdom in recent years. But in *Only the Dead*, award-winning author Bear Braumoeller demonstrates that it shouldn't have. With a rare combination of historical expertise, statistical acumen, and accessible prose, Braumoeller shows that the evidence simply doesn't support the decline-of-war thesis propounded by scholars like Steven Pinker. He argues that the key to understanding trends in warfare lies, not in the spread of humanitarian values, but rather in the formation of international orders--sets of expectations about behavior that allow countries to work in concert, as they did in the Concert of Europe and have done in the postwar Western liberal order. With a nod toward the American sociologist Charles Tilly, who argued that "war made the state and the state made war," Braumoeller shows argues that the same is true of international orders: while they reduce conflict within their borders, they can also clash violently with one another, as the Western and communist orders did throughout the Cold War. Both highly readable and rigorous, *Only the Dead* offers a realistic assessment of humanity's quest to abolish warfare. While pessimists have been too quick to discount the successes of our attempts to reduce international conflict, optimists are prone to put too much faith in human nature. Reality lies somewhere in between: While the aspirations of humankind to govern its behavior with reason and justice have had shocking success in moderating the harsh dictates of realpolitik, the institutions that we have created to prevent war are unlikely to achieve anything like total success--as evidenced by the multitude of conflicts in recent decades. As the old adage advises us, only the dead have seen the end of war.

This analysis of the origins of major wars, since the development of the modern state system in Europe centuries ago, also considers the problems involved in preventing a contemporary nuclear war.

How professionalization and scholarly "rigor" made social scientists increasingly irrelevant to US national security policy To mobilize America's intellectual resources to meet the security challenges of the post-9/11 world, US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates observed that "we must again embrace eggheads and ideas." But the gap between national security policymakers and international relations scholars has become a chasm. In *Cult of the Irrelevant*, Michael Desch traces the history of the relationship between the Beltway and the Ivory Tower from World War I to the present day. Recounting key Golden Age academic strategists such as Thomas Schelling and Walt Rostow, Desch's narrative shows that social science research became most oriented toward practical problem-solving during times of war and that scholars returned to less relevant work during peacetime. Social science disciplines like political science rewarded work that was methodologically sophisticated over scholarship that engaged with the messy realities of national security policy, and academic culture increasingly turned away from the job of solving real-world problems. In the name of scientific objectivity, academics today frequently engage only in basic research that they hope will somehow trickle down to policymakers. Drawing on the lessons of this history as well as a unique survey of current and former national security policymakers, Desch offers concrete recommendations for scholars who want to shape government work. The result is a rich intellectual history and an essential wake-up call to a field that has lost its way.

Elucidates the psychological factors involved in foreign policymaking and international relations, maintaining that the perceptions of world decision makers diverge from reality in detectable patterns

In this seminal work, published by the C.I.A. itself, produced by Intelligence veteran Richards Heuer discusses three pivotal points. First, human minds are ill-equipped ("poorly wired") to cope effectively with both inherent and induced uncertainty. Second, increased knowledge of our inherent biases tends to be of little assistance to the analyst. And lastly, tools and techniques that apply higher levels of critical thinking can substantially improve analysis on complex problems.

The authors' conclusions offer important insights for superpower bargaining and nuclear deterrence.

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-- Debuting in its first edition, *American Foreign Policy in a New Era* takes the contemporary challenges of globalization and hyper-partisanship as its starting point, and surveys how foreign policy is made and to what ends. This brief text is not only a review of theory, history, actors, institutions, and key policies but also an examination of how policymakers are affected by domestic and international political factors.

Telling a uniquely engaging story of how foreign policy is made, *American Foreign Policy in a New Era* help readers understand the changing leadership role of the United States and the effect of world politics on the everyday life of Americans. 0205853641 / 9780205853649 *American Foreign Policy in a New Era Plus MySearchLab with eText* -- Access Card Package Package consists of: 0205210244 / 9780205210244 *American Foreign Policy in a New Era* 0205239927 / 9780205239924 *MySearchLab with Pearson eText* -- Valuepack Access Card

Political psychology applies what is known about human psychology to the study of politics. It examines how people reach political decisions on topics such as voting, party identification, and political attitudes as well as how leaders mediate political conflicts and make foreign policy decisions.

The *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* gathers together a distinguished group of scholars from around the world to shed light on these vital questions. Focusing first on political psychology at the individual level (attitudes, values, decision-making, ideology, personality) and then moving to the collective (group identity, mass mobilization, political violence), this fully interdisciplinary volume covers models of the mass public and political elites and addresses both domestic issues and foreign policy. Now with new material providing an up-to-date account of cutting-edge research within both psychology and political science, this is an essential reference for scholars and students interested in the intersection of the two fields.

Looks at how nuclear weapons have affected the meaning of war, the psychology of statesmanship, and the formulation of military policy

Robert Jervis has been a pioneering leader in the study of the psychology of international politics for more than four decades. *How Statesmen Think* presents his most important ideas on the subject from across his career. This collection of revised and updated essays applies, elaborates, and modifies his pathbreaking work. The result is an indispensable book for students and scholars of international relations. *How Statesmen Think* demonstrates that expectations and political and psychological needs are the major drivers of perceptions in international politics, as well as in other arenas. Drawing on the increasing attention psychology is paying to emotions, the book discusses how emotional needs help structure beliefs. It also shows how decision-makers use multiple shortcuts to seek and process information when making foreign policy and national security judgments. For example, the desire to conserve cognitive resources can cause decision-makers to look at misleading indicators of military strength, and psychological pressures can lead them to run particularly high risks. The book also looks at how deterrent threats and counterpart promises often fail because they are misperceived. *How Statesmen Think* examines how these processes play out in many situations that arise in foreign and security policy, including the threat of inadvertent war, the development of domino beliefs, the formation and role of national identities, and conflicts between intelligence organizations and policymakers.

The dynamics of world politics are investigated in a comprehensive study of the national, regional, and global systems

Revolution within a state almost invariably leads to intense security competition between states, and often to war. In *Revolution and War*, Stephen M. Walt explains why this is so, and suggests how the risk of conflicts brought on by domestic upheaval might be reduced in the future. In doing so, he explores one of the basic questions of international relations: What are the connections between domestic politics and foreign policy? Walt begins by exposing the flaws in existing theories about the relationship between revolution and war. Drawing on the theoretical literature about revolution and the realist perspective on international politics, he argues that revolutions cause wars by altering the balance of threats between a revolutionary state and its rivals. Each state sees the other as both a looming danger and a vulnerable adversary, making war seem both necessary and attractive. Walt traces the dynamics of this argument through detailed studies of the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions, and through briefer treatment of the American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese cases. He also considers the experience of the Soviet Union, whose revolutionary transformation led to conflict within the former Soviet empire but not with the outside world. An important refinement of realist approaches to international politics, this book unites the study of revolution with scholarship on the causes of war.

A series of investigations, especially in Great Britain and the United States, have focused attention on the performance of national intelligence services. At the same time, terrorism and a broad span of trans-national security challenges has highlighted the crucial role of intelligence. This book takes stock of the underlying intellectual sub-structure of intelligence. For intelligence, as for other areas of policy, serious intellectual inquiry is the basis for improving the performance of real-world institutions. The volume explores intelligence from an intellectual perspective, not an organizational one. Instead the book identifies themes that run through these applications, such as the lack of comprehensive theories, the unclear relations between providers and users of intelligence, and the predominance of bureaucratic organizations driven by collection. A key element is the development, or rather non-development, of intelligence toward an established set of methods and standards and, above all, an ongoing scientific discourse.

Written by leading scholars in the field, *Causes of War* provides the first comprehensive analysis of the leading theories relating to the origins of both interstate and civil wars. Utilizes historical examples to illustrate individual theories throughout Includes an analysis of theories of civil wars as well as interstate wars -- one of the only texts to do both Written by two former International Studies Association Presidents

"A state's power to compel or deter other states to either act or refrain from acting has been a foundational source of world politics since the time of Thucydides. Yet the specific features of deterrence and compellence constantly change in accordance with historical development. In our own lifetimes, for instance, the rising significance of non-state actors and the increasing influence of regional powers have dramatically transformed international politics since the height of the Cold War. Yet much of the existing literature on deterrence and compellence

continues to draw, whether implicitly or explicitly, upon assumptions and precepts formulated in a state-centric, bipolar world. Although contemporary coercion frequently features multiple coercers targeting state and non-state adversaries with non-military instruments of persuasion, most literature on coercion still focuses primarily on cases where a single state is trying to coerce another single state via traditional military means. In *The Power to Hurt*, the leading international relations scholars Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause have gathered together an eminent cast of contributors (e.g., Bob Art, Dan Drezner, Alex Downes, Erik Gartzke, and others) to produce what promises to be a field-shaping work on one of IR's most essential subjects: coercion, whether in the form of compellence, deterrence, or a mix of the two. The volume moves beyond these traditional premises and examines the critical issue of coercion in the 21st century, capturing fresh theoretical and policy relevant developments and drawing upon data and cases from across time and around the globe" --

How cognitive biases can guide good decision making in politics and international relations A widespread assumption in political science and international relations is that cognitive biases—quirks of the brain we all share as human beings—are detrimental and responsible for policy failures, disasters, and wars. In *Strategic Instincts*, Dominic Johnson challenges this assumption, explaining that these nonrational behaviors can actually support favorable results in international politics and contribute to political and strategic success. By studying past examples, he considers the ways that cognitive biases act as “strategic instincts,” lending a competitive edge in policy decisions, especially under conditions of unpredictability and imperfect information. Drawing from evolutionary theory and behavioral sciences, Johnson looks at three influential cognitive biases—overconfidence, the fundamental attribution error, and in-group/out-group bias. He then examines the advantageous as well as the detrimental effects of these biases through historical case studies of the American Revolution, the Munich Crisis, and the Pacific campaign in World War II. He acknowledges the dark side of biases—when confidence becomes hubris, when attribution errors become paranoia, and when group bias becomes prejudice. Ultimately, Johnson makes a case for a more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of cognitive biases and argues that in the complex world of international relations, strategic instincts can, in the right context, guide better performance. *Strategic Instincts* shows how an evolutionary perspective can offer the crucial next step in bringing psychological insights to bear on foundational questions in international politics.

Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma explores how the phenomenon of ethnic violence can be understood as a form of security dilemma by shifting the focus of the concept away from its traditional concern with state sovereignty to that of identity instead. The book includes case studies on: * ethnic violence between Serbs and Croats in the Krajina region of Croatia, August 1990 * ethnic violence between Hungarian and Romanians in the Transylvania region of Romania, March 1990.

Super Bomb unveils the story of the events leading up to President Harry S. Truman's 1950 decision to develop a "super," or hydrogen, bomb. That fateful decision and its immediate consequences are detailed in a diverse and complete account built on newly released archives and previously hidden contemporaneous interviews with more than sixty political, military, and scientific figures who were involved in the decision. Ken Young and Warner R. Schilling present the expectations, hopes, and fears of the key individuals who lobbied for and against developing the H-bomb. They portray the conflicts that arose over the H-bomb as rooted in the distinct interests of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Los Alamos laboratory, the Pentagon and State Department, the Congress, and the White House. But as they clearly show, once Truman made his decision in 1950, resistance to the H-bomb opportunistically shifted to new debates about the development of tactical nuclear weapons, continental air defense, and other aspects of nuclear weapons policy. What *Super Bomb* reveals is that in many ways the H-bomb struggle was a proxy battle over the morality and effectiveness of strategic bombardment and the role and doctrine of the US Strategic Air Command.

The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In *Why Intelligence Fails*, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations—analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind—were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.

States are more likely to engage in risky and destabilizing actions such as military buildups and preemptive strikes if they believe their adversaries pose a tangible threat. Yet despite the crucial importance of this issue, we don't know enough about how states and their leaders draw inferences about their adversaries' long-term intentions. Knowing the Adversary draws on a wealth of historical archival evidence to shed new light on how world leaders and intelligence organizations actually make these assessments. Keren Yarhi-Milo examines three cases: Britain's assessments of Nazi Germany's intentions in the 1930s, America's assessments of the Soviet Union's intentions during the Carter administration, and the Reagan administration's assessments of Soviet intentions near the end of the Cold War. She advances a new theoretical framework—called selective attention—that emphasizes organizational dynamics, personal diplomatic interactions, and cognitive and affective factors. Yarhi-Milo finds that decision makers don't pay as much attention to those aspects of state behavior that major theories of international politics claim they do. Instead, they tend to determine the intentions of adversaries on the basis of preexisting beliefs, theories, and personal impressions. Yarhi-Milo also shows how intelligence organizations rely on very different indicators than decision makers, focusing more on changes in the military capabilities of adversaries. Knowing the Adversary provides a clearer picture of the historical validity of existing theories, and broadens our understanding of the important role that diplomacy plays in international security.

How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors' expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data,

gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible. Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt. His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding to deprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy.

From acclaimed political scientist Diana Mutz, a revealing look at why people's attitudes on trade differ from their own self-interest. *Winners and Losers* challenges conventional wisdom about how American citizens form opinions on international trade. While dominant explanations in economics emphasize personal self-interest—and whether individuals gain or lose financially as a result of trade—this book takes a psychological approach, demonstrating how people view the complex world of international trade through the lens of interpersonal relations. Drawing on psychological theories of preference formation as well as original surveys and experiments, Diana Mutz finds that in contrast to the economic view of trade as cooperation for mutual benefit, many Americans view trade as a competition between the United States and other countries—a contest of us versus them. These people favor trade as long as they see Americans as the "winners" in these interactions, viewing trade as a way to establish dominance over foreign competitors. For others, trade is a means of maintaining more peaceful relations between countries. Just as individuals may exchange gifts to cement relationships, international trade is a tie that binds nations together in trust and cooperation. *Winners and Losers* reveals how people's orientations toward in-groups and out-groups play a central role in influencing how they think about trade with foreign countries, and shows how a better understanding of the psychological underpinnings of public opinion can lead to lasting economic and societal benefits.

Realism remains a predominant and most debated theoretical approach in International Relations research. Whether considered a scientific and accurate reflection of world politics or as reactionary and a distortion of realities and possibilities, both realism and its structural variant continue to be a source of fruitful research—whether within the program or in its rejection. The Realism approach itself is not uniform whether in relation to its implications or methodologies. Here leading scholars provide important perspectives on the insights and directions of Realist research in some of its most interesting variants. From rational choice to case studies, from theory to practice, the contributors explore both classic tenets of Realism as the balance of power and such apparent inconsistencies as foolish policies.

How policies forged after September 11 were weaponized under Trump and turned on American democracy itself. In the wake of the September 11 terror attacks, the American government implemented a wave of overt policies to fight the nation's enemies. Unseen and undetected by the public, however, another set of tools were brought to bear on the domestic front. In this riveting book, one of today's leading experts on the US security state shows how these "subtle tools" imperiled the very foundations of democracy, from the separation of powers and transparency in government to adherence to the Constitution. Taking readers from Ground Zero to the Capitol insurrection, Karen Greenberg describes the subtle tools that were forged under George W. Bush in the name of security: imprecise language, bureaucratic confusion, secrecy, and the bypassing of procedural and legal norms. While the power and legacy of these tools lasted into the Obama years, reliance on them increased exponentially in the Trump era, both in the fight against terrorism abroad and in battles closer to home. Greenberg discusses how the Trump administration weaponized these tools to separate families at the border, suppress Black Lives Matter protests, and attempt to overturn the 2020 presidential election. Revealing the deeper consequences of the war on terror, *Subtle Tools* paints a troubling portrait of an increasingly undemocratic America where disinformation, xenophobia, and disdain for the law became the new norm, and where the subtle tools of national security threatened democracy itself.

An in-depth look at the historic and strategic deployment of rights in political conflicts throughout the world. Rights are usually viewed as defensive concepts representing mankind's highest aspirations to protect the vulnerable and uplift the downtrodden. But since the Enlightenment, political combatants have also used rights belligerently, to batter despised communities, demolish existing institutions, and smash opposing ideas. Delving into a range of historical and contemporary conflicts from all areas of the globe, *Rights as Weapons* focuses on the underexamined ways in which the powerful wield rights as aggressive weapons against the weak. Clifford Bob looks at how political forces use rights as rallying cries: naturalizing novel claims as rights inherent in humanity, absolutizing them as trumps over rival interests or community concerns, universalizing them as transcultural and transhistorical, and depoliticizing them as concepts beyond debate. He shows how powerful proponents employ rights as camouflage to cover ulterior motives, as crowbars to break rival coalitions, as blockades to suppress subordinate groups, as spears to puncture discrete policies, and as dynamite to explode whole societies. And he demonstrates how the targets of rights campaigns repulse such assaults, using their own rights-like weapons: denying the abuses they are accused of, constructing rival rights to protect themselves, portraying themselves as victims rather than violators, and repudiating authoritative decisions against them. This sophisticated framework is applied to a diverse range of examples, including nineteenth-century voting rights movements; the American civil rights movement; nationalist, populist, and religious movements in today's Europe; and internationalized conflicts related to Palestinian self-determination, animal rights, gay rights, and transgender rights. Comparing key episodes in the deployment of rights, *Rights as Weapons* opens new perspectives on an idea that is central to legal and political conflicts.

Based on more than three decades of observation, Robert Jervis concludes in this provocative book that the very foundations of many social science theories—especially those in political science—are faulty. Taking insights from complexity theory as his point of departure, the author observes that we live in a world where things are interconnected, where unintended consequences of our actions are unavoidable and unpredictable, and where the total effect of behavior is not equal to the sum of individual actions. Jervis draws on a wide range of human endeavors to illustrate the nature of these system effects. He shows how increasing airport security might actually cost lives, not save them, and how removing dead trees (ostensibly to give living trees more room) may damage the health of an entire forest. Similarly, he highlights the interconnectedness of the political world as he describes how the Cold War played out and as he narrates the series of events—with their unintended consequences—that escalated into World War I. The ramifications of developing a rigorous understanding of politics are immense, as Jervis demonstrates in his critique of current systemic theories of international politics—especially the influential work done by Kenneth Waltz. Jervis goes on to examine various types of negative and positive feedback, bargaining in different types of relationships, and the polarizing effects of

alignments to begin building a foundation for a more realistic, more nuanced, theory of international politics. *System Effects* concludes by examining what it means to act in a system. It shows how political actors might modify their behavior in anticipation of system effects, and it explores how systemic theories of political behavior might account for the role of anticipation and strategy in political action. This work introduces powerful new concepts that will reward not only international relations theorists, but also all social scientists with interests in comparative politics and political theory.

Drawing upon philosophy and social theory, *Social Theory of International Politics* develops a theory of the international system as a social construction. Alexander Wendt clarifies the central claims of the constructivist approach, presenting a structural and idealist worldview which contrasts with the individualism and materialism which underpins much mainstream international relations theory. He builds a cultural theory of international politics, which takes whether states view each other as enemies, rivals or friends as a fundamental determinant. Wendt characterises these roles as 'cultures of anarchy', described as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian respectively. These cultures are shared ideas which help shape state interests and capabilities, and generate tendencies in the international system. The book describes four factors which can drive structural change from one culture to another - interdependence, common fate, homogenization, and self-restraint - and examines the effects of capitalism and democracy in the emergence of a Kantian culture in the West.

How can two enemies transform their relationship into a cooperative one? The starting point for this book is that the discipline of International Relations has not done a good job of answering this question, and the reason for this is that the concept of trust - and the possibility of building new trusting relationships between enemies - has been marginalized by the discipline. The author argues that to understand how enemies cooperate, we need to focus on the potential for building trusting relationships between state leaders. The book argues that it is forging personal relationships of trust across the enemy divide that hold out the best chance of breaking down the 'enemy images' that fuel security competition. Previous theorizing about trust-building in the discipline of International Relations has focused on the state and individual levels. Nicholas Wheeler argues for a new level of analysis - the interpersonal level - and shows how the building of trust between leaders changes the possibilities for cooperation between states. He shows how the process of interpersonal bonding between two leaders - especially through face-to-face diplomacy - can lead to what he calls a 'leap-to-trust'. He develops his argument through three detailed case studies: the interaction between US and Soviet leaders Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev; the relationship between Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif in the context of the Lahore peace process; and the failed attempts by Barack Obama to build a trusting relationship with Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The book represents the most authoritative assessment to date of trust research in International Relations and it develops a theory that explains how interpersonal trusting relationships become possible at the highest levels of diplomacy; relationships that in transforming enemy images reconstitute the possibilities of state action in conflict situations.

The summation of more than two thousand years of one of the world's most august literary traditions, this volume also represents the achievements of four hundred years of Western scholarship on China. The selections include poetry, drama, fiction, songs, biographies, and works of early Chinese philosophy and history rendered in English by the most renowned translators of classical Chinese literature: Arthur Waley, Ezra Pound, David Hawkes, James Legge, Burton Watson, Stephen Owen, Cyril Birch, A. C. Graham, Witter Bynner, Kenneth Rexroth, and others. Arranged chronologically and by genre, each chapter is introduced by definitive quotes and brief introductions chosen from classic Western sinological treatises. Beginning with discussions of the origins of the Chinese writing system and selections from the earliest "genre" of Chinese literature -- the Oracle Bone inscriptions -- the book then proceeds with selections from: • early myths and legends; • the earliest anthology of Chinese poetry, the *Book of Songs*; • early narrative and philosophy, including the *I Ching*, *Tao-te Ching*, and the *Analects of Confucius*; • rhapsodies, historical writings, magical biographies, ballads, poetry, and miscellaneous prose from the Han and Six Dynasties period; • the court poetry of the Southern Dynasties; • the finest gems of Tang poetry; and • lyrics, stories, and tales of the Sui, Tang, and Five Dynasties eras. Special highlights include individual chapters covering each of the luminaries of Tang poetry: Wang Wei, Li Bo, Du Fu, and Bo Juyi; early literary criticism; women poets from the first to the tenth century C.E.; and the poetry of Zen and the Tao. Bibliographies, explanatory notes, copious illustrations, a chronology of major dynasties, and two-way romanization tables coordinating the Wade-Giles and pinyin transliteration systems provide helpful tools to aid students, teachers, and general readers in exploring this rich tradition of world literature.

Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making presents a psychological approach to foreign policy decision making. This approach focuses on the decision process, dynamics, and outcome. The book includes a wealth of extended real-world case studies and examples that are woven into the text. The cases and examples, which are written in an accessible style, include decisions made by leaders of the United States, Israel, New Zealand, Cuba, Iceland, United Kingdom, and others. In addition to coverage of the rational model of decision making, levels of analysis of foreign policy decision making, and types of decisions, the book includes extensive material on alternatives to the rational choice model, the marketing and framing of decisions, cognitive biases, and domestic, cultural, and international influences on decision making in international affairs. Existing textbooks do not present such an approach to foreign policy decision making, international relations, American foreign policy, and comparative foreign policy.

Internal conflict continues to be the most common form of organized violence, most often occurring in a so-called 'arc of instability' comprised of Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. The misery and death caused by these conflicts, with helpless civilians often victims, has resulted in states and coalitions of states intervening militarily to stop the bloodshed, giving rise to many difficult issues. When should states perform military intervention? How should it be conducted? Is intervention a tactic that can be executed exclusive of other considerations or must it be part of a wider strategy? What makes it a success? And when can occupying troops return home? *Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century* strives to answer these and other questions by comparing and contrasting both the theory and practice of military intervention. It thoroughly reviews the literature and derives a set of guidelines for initiating, conducting, and terminating this complex undertaking. It then evaluates the validity of these guidelines by analyzing the recent cases of Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Cambodia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. The volume concludes with lessons on the why, when, and how of conducting a military intervention and offers recommendations for Afghanistan and Iraq.

Reinvestigates realism in the context of international relations through a dialogue between classical international theory and critical theoretical challenges to it. Essays in international theory are combined with writings in critical and poststructuralist theories of international relations.

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