

Chaos As Strategy Us Army War College

This text explains and synthesizes the functioning and relationships of numerous Defense, Joint, and Army organizations, systems, and processes involved in the development and sustainment of trained and ready forces for the Combatant Commanders. It is designed to be used by the faculty and students at the U.S. Army War College (as well as other training and educational institutions) as they improve their knowledge and understanding of "How the Army Runs." We are proud of the value that senior commanders and staffs place in this text and are pleased to continue to provide this reference.

The word "strategy" pervades American conversation and our news media and is most often used as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action, or a "vision" of the direction in which to proceed at the personal, organizational, and governmental--local, state, or federal--levels. Such casual use of the term to describe nothing more than "what we would like to do next" is inappropriate and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. This "little book" talks about big strategy, strategy at the highest levels of the nation-state. It is applicable to grand strategy, national security strategy, national military strategy, and regional or theater strategy. The monograph does not propose a strategy for the United States; rather, it provides a framework for considering strategy at any of the levels mentioned above. It is an examination of theory, exploring those aspects of strategy that appear to have universal application. The theory also may have application to the strategy of nonstate actors, institutions, and businesses, but the explicit purpose and perspective offered herein focus on the nation-state.

In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy 'works'. The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic behaviour, which means that, of necessity, it must "work" as strategy works. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is reviewed empathetically, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court. The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his argument: those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; in World War I; and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.

Conventional political theory holds that the sovereign state is the legitimate source of order and provider of public

services in any society, whether democratic or not. But Hezbollah and ISIS in the Middle East, pirate clans in Africa, criminal gangs in South America, and militias in Southeast Asia are examples of nonstate actors that control local territory and render public services that the nation-state cannot or will not provide. This fascinating book takes the reader around the world to areas where national governance has broken down—or never really existed. In these places, the vacuum has been filled by local gangs, militias, and warlords, some with ideological or political agendas and others focused primarily on economic gain. Many of these actors have substantial popularity and support among local populations and have developed their own enduring institutions, often undermining the legitimacy of the national state. The authors show that the rest of the world has more than a passing interest in these situations, in part because transborder crime and terrorism often emerge but also because failed states threaten international interests from trade to security. This book also poses, and offers answers for, the question: How should the international community respond to local orders dominated by armed nonstate actors? In many cases outsiders have taken the short-term route—accepting unsavory local actors out of expediency—but at the price of long-term instability or damage to human rights and other considerations. From Africa and the Middle East to Asia and Latin America, the local situations highlighted in this book are, and will remain, high on today's international agenda. The book makes a unique contribution to global understanding of how those situations developed and what can be done about them. This title is part of the Geopolitics in the 21st Century series.

The world stands on the threshold of a new era. The changes of 1989 have unhinged our national security strategy. At the center of the new strategic debate rests the question of the Army's participation in the strategic planning process. Many land force advocates believe now is the time for the Army to take the lead in this process. To support that theme, this paper first projects a future strategic environment of a multi-polar world erupting in potential chaos. The author next discusses the strategic language the Army must use to participate in this strategic planning process and the impact of emerging joint doctrine on future strategic planning. Finally, an Army strategic vision is proffered which rejects deterrence as its end but accepts the role of armed force, primarily landpower, in maintaining order in a changing and volatile world. Army planning; Military strategy/doctrine. (edc).

UNLEASH THE FULL POTENTIAL OF YOUR ORGANIZATION Tame the Chaos introduces you to powerful strategy and planning processes. You will learn to apply to your own organization the very same innovative methods used by the U.S. military to solve complex, vexing problems. Dr. Randall has adapted these techniques to make them accessible to, and effective for, any size company, thereby dramatically reducing the time and resources required to effectively create a comprehensive solution that addresses critical problems, not just the symptoms, while retaining the core values and core

purpose of your organization. You are invited to read and use the Values-Based Strategic Process, including the groundbreaking concept of Strategic Design. Within a short time, you will be able to effectively Tame the Chaos and unleash the full potential of your organization through decisive action.

Special Forces soldiers are daring, seasoned troops from America's heartland, selected in a tough competition and trained in an extraordinary range of skills. They know foreign languages and cultures and unconventional warfare better than any U.S. fighters, and while they prefer to stay out of the limelight, veteran war correspondent Linda Robinson gained access to their closed world. She traveled with them on the frontlines, interviewed them at length on their home bases, and studied their doctrine, methods and history. In *Masters of Chaos* she tells their story through a select group of senior sergeants and field-grade officers, a band of unforgettable characters like Rawhide, Killer, Michael T, and Alan -- led by the unflappable Lt. Col. Chris Conner and Col. Charlie Cleveland, a brilliant but self-effacing West Pointer who led the largest unconventional war campaign since Vietnam in northern Iraq. Robinson follows the Special Forces from their first post-Vietnam combat in Panama, El Salvador, Desert Storm, Somalia, and the Balkans to their recent trials and triumphs in Afghanistan and Iraq. She witnessed their secret sleuthing and unsung successes in southern Iraq, and recounts here for the first time the dramatic firefights of the western desert. Her blow-by-blow story of the attack on Ansar al-Islam's international terrorist training camp has never been told before. The most comprehensive account ever of the modern-day Special Forces in action, *Masters of Chaos* is filled with riveting, intimate detail in the words of a close-knit band of soldiers who have done it all.

This book examines the United States military's use of concepts from non-linear science, such as chaos and complexity theory, in its efforts to theorise information-age warfare. Over the past three decades, the US defence community has shown an increasing interest in learning lessons from the non-linear sciences. Theories, strategies, and doctrines of warfare that have guided the conduct of US forces in recent conflicts have been substantially influenced by ideas borrowed from non-linear science, including manoeuvre warfare, network-centric warfare, and counterinsurgency. This book accounts for the uses that the US military has made of non-linear science by examining the long-standing historical relationship between the natural sciences and Western militaries. It identifies concepts and metaphors borrowed from natural science as a key formative factor behind the development of military theory, strategy, and doctrine. In doing so, *Nonlinear Science and Warfare* not only improves our understanding of the relationship between military professional identity, professional military education, and changes in technology, but also provides important insights into the evolving nature of conflict in the Information Age. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, military science, US foreign policy, technology and war, and security studies.

The primary research question for this study is whether the US can use the concept of 'system shock' to better operate in the Grey Zone. 'System shock' combines ideas from systems theory, chaos theory, and complexity theory to link the ideas of bifurcation and operational shock. System shock is an archetype for military operations that focuses on bifurcating any opposing system to achieve operational shock. This monograph argues that system shock provides military leaders and planners with a framework to fight and win in Grey Zone

environments and that this concept nests within Unified Land Operations (ULO) doctrine by testing three claims. The first claim is that system shock is a useful framework to interpret and affect system behavior. The second claim is that the Grey Zone is a complex adaptive system, which allows the system shock framework to apply. The final claim is that system shock nests within current US Army ULO doctrine. The theory of system shock does not dictate specific action. Instead, it proposes a conceptual framework to interpret and understand how operations progress and to train the military planner's mind to look for connections in more places and with a greater purpose behind short-term gains. The theory of system shock can help leaders and planners best identify and address the correct problem in the Gray Zone and other military operations. Therefore, this monograph provides operational artists and military practitioners with an additional lens to use when planning and executing operations. Contents: 1. Introduction 2. Literature Review 3. The System Shock Framework 4. The Gray Zone 5. Unified Land Operations 6. Analysis 7. Conclusion A problem with the current set of military operations planning tools is not their inherent usefulness, but the foundational logic planners and leaders use when they implement them. Currently, the predominant logic comes from the first grammar of war, which focuses on simply overthrowing the enemy's forces. The combination of complexity and systems theories, with a focus on operational shock, provides practitioners with a set of tools that allows them to operate independently of either grammar, but which may offer new insights into planning for second grammar warfare. By focusing on the opposing system as a whole versus simply overthrowing the enemy force, leaders and planners can develop operational approaches which address an opposing system or systems based on their unique environment. When developing operational approaches, this logic offers a real benefit by encouraging a different focus for operations. Another benefit of an operational shock focus is the ability for a military force using limited means to successfully oppose an opponent fighting an existential crisis with all means available. This type of conflict, where one side is fully committed, and the other is not, relates most closely to second grammar operations. One of the biggest potential problems with these conflicts is that the United States military engages in limited war against opponents fighting an absolute war. Such a mismatch in means can be linked to Clausewitz's idea that war is a duel on a bigger scale. This idea, Clausewitz argued, means that an enemy's will to fight and continue fighting should be matched by the will of friendly forces, otherwise friendly forces will lose.

Volume II continues the analyses and discussion of national security policy and strategy.

What is Soviet-American competition all about? Is the Soviet Union a security problem that the United States must solve? Or is it an insecurity condition with which the U.S. must learn to live -- and if so, on what terms? What kind of a player is the United States in the great game of power politics? In *The Geopolitics of Super Power*, one of our most respected strategic theorists answers these and other questions. In geopolitical terms, Colin Gray sees the Soviet-American antagonism as an enduring contest between a continental empire and a maritime coalition, each with its distinctive character and purposes. Gray explores the roots of the American style in foreign policy and strategy, and how that style relates to defense options. He identifies four broad alternatives for U.S. national security policy: passive and active means of containment, disengagement from foreign security commitments, and the "rollback" of the Soviet empire. Gray argues vigorously for active containment, for the systematic deemphasis of nuclear weapons, and for the intelligent use, for deterrence and defense purposes, of the West's great competitive strengths in the political, economic, and technological spheres.

#1 NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER • A clear-eyed account of learning how to lead in a chaotic world, by General Jim Mattis—the former Secretary of Defense and one of the most formidable strategic thinkers of our time—and Bing West, a former assistant secretary of defense and combat Marine. “A four-star general’s five-star memoir.”—*The Wall Street Journal* Call Sign Chaos is the account of Jim Mattis’s storied

career, from wide-ranging leadership roles in three wars to ultimately commanding a quarter of a million troops across the Middle East. Along the way, Mattis recounts his foundational experiences as a leader, extracting the lessons he has learned about the nature of warfighting and peacemaking, the importance of allies, and the strategic dilemmas—and short-sighted thinking—now facing our nation. He makes it clear why America must return to a strategic footing so as not to continue winning battles but fighting inconclusive wars. Mattis divides his book into three parts: Direct Leadership, Executive Leadership, and Strategic Leadership. In the first part, Mattis recalls his early experiences leading Marines into battle, when he knew his troops as well as his own brothers. In the second part, he explores what it means to command thousands of troops and how to adapt your leadership style to ensure your intent is understood by your most junior troops so that they can own their mission. In the third part, Mattis describes the challenges and techniques of leadership at the strategic level, where military leaders reconcile war's grim realities with political leaders' human aspirations, where complexity reigns and the consequences of imprudence are severe, even catastrophic. Call Sign Chaos is a memoir of a life of warfighting and lifelong learning, following along as Mattis rises from Marine recruit to four-star general. It is a journey about learning to lead and a story about how he, through constant study and action, developed a unique leadership philosophy, one relevant to us all.

Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History

Routledge
CMH Pub. 93-10. 1st printing. On cover: World War 2 50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition. Spine title reads: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941. Describes the planning process that Major Albert Coady Wedemeyer used in the summer of 1941 to write the plan that became the outline for mobilization and operations during World War 2. Includes an appendix, "The Army Portion of the Victory Plan, Ultimate Requirements Study, Estimate of Ground Forces." Also includes photographs, footnotes, a bibliography, and an index.

War is the most brutal of human endeavors, and I have experienced enough war to know to take cover when politicians and poets and armchair warriors speak extravagantly of patriotism and national honor. Join Major General Schloesser in the daily grind of warfare fought in the most forbidding of terrain, with sometimes uncertain or untested allies, Afghan corruption and Pakistani bet hedging, and the mounting casualties of war which erode and bring into question Schloesser's most profoundly held convictions and beliefs. Among several battles, Schloesser takes readers deep into the Battle of Wanat, where nine U.S. soldiers were killed in a fierce, up-close fight to prevent a new operating base from being overrun. This encounter required Schloesser to make tactical decisions that had dramatic strategic impact, and led him to doubts: Can this war even be won? If so, what will it take? This book is a rare insight and reflection into the thoughts of critical national decision-makers including President George W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, then Senator Barack Obama, and numerous foreign leaders including Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Key military leaders—including then Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, then Central Command Commanding General David Petraeus, then Lieutenant General and future Chairman Martin Dempsey, and International Security Force Commander General David McKiernan—all play roles in the book, among many others, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Mark Milley and Army Chief of Staff General James McConville. Analyzing their leadership in the chaos of war Schloesser ultimately concludes that successful leadership in combat is best based on competence, courage, and character.

Let's feel the world's pulse : the emergence of the future Chinese leadership, the United States policy and the Arab world, the US military budget for 2011, the START treaty, the nuclear issues, Obama's military policy, the consequences of the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the illusion of the Middle East peace process, the tripartite alliance between Syria, Iran and Hezbollah, or the risks of war between Israel and Iran... Through a dozen of political chronicles, the specialist Nasser Zammit outlines the main directions of international policies taken in

2010/2011. A brilliant worldwide exam of the foreign strategies and new stakes that picture tomorrow's world.

Life is often filled with chaos and struggles that come in many forms. Chaos could be with your finances, career, marriage or relationships, health, a crisis, and now even with a global pandemic. Battling life's chaos often seems unfair, and it feels like we have no chance of winning. This book is a fresh and unique approach to personal development that aims to solve this problem. You will be shown how to take a military strategy, apply it to your life, and ultimately bring order to life's chaos. Then you will be taught how to use "The LAW of Personal Development" to completely transform your life. Most books for personal development tend to give you a tool to solve a problem. A tool is often nothing without a reliable process, and that is why many people fail to make the necessary changes in their life. This book aims to give you that process. Whether you have done nothing in regards to personal development, or you are deep in your journey, this book can help.

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"Discussions of an emerging practice of 'gray zone' conflict have become increasingly common throughout the U.S. Army and the wider national security community, but the concept remains ill-defined and poorly understood. This monograph aims to contribute to the emerging dialogue about competition and rivalry in the gray zone by defining the term, comparing and contrasting it with related theories, and offering tentative hypotheses about this increasingly important form of state competition. The idea of operating gradually and somewhat covertly to remain below key thresholds of response is hardly new. Many approaches being used today -- such as support for proxy forces and insurgent militias -- have been employed for millennia. The monograph argues that the emergence of this more coherent and intentional form of gray zone conflict is best understood as the confluence of three factors. Understood in this context, gray zone strategies can be defined as a form of conflict that pursues political objectives through integrated campaigns; employs mostly nonmilitary or nonkinetic tools; strives to remain under key escalatory or red line thresholds to avoid outright conventional conflict; and moves gradually toward its objectives rather than seeking conclusive results in a relatively limited period of time. Having examined the scope and character of gray zone conflict, the monograph offers seven hypotheses about this emerging form of rivalry. Finally, the monograph offers recommendations for the United States and its friends and allies to deal with this challenge"--Publisher's web site.

Leaders and managers face tremendous pressure to keep their organizations moving forward successfully. It can seem like an impossible task amid economic uncertainty and hyper-competition. The roles of leader and manager tug us in opposite directions: managers seek stability and predictability, and leaders usually opt for turbulence and change. With so many companies asking their best employees to be both leaders and managers, it's no wonder that so much of the business world is dysfunctional. This guidebook explains how leader-managers work—and how to succeed in both roles. You can learn how to

- leverage competing requirements for leading and managing change;
- formulate effective operational and developmental strategies;
- make decisions that address complex challenges and

opportunities; and • help people through the anxiety and trauma of change. Whether you are a student seeking to understand the workplace, an employee rising up the ranks or an active leader or manager, Strategic Leadership and Strategic Management provides you with tools and knowledge to help your organization succeed.

Volume 2, *Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations*, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?

The third in Robert Greene's bestselling series is now available in a pocket sized concise edition. Following *48 Laws of Power* and *The Art of Seduction*, here is a brilliant distillation of the strategies of war to help you wage triumphant battles everyday. Spanning world civilisations, and synthesising dozens of political, philosophical, and religious texts, *The Concise 33 Strategies of War* is a guide to the subtle social game of everyday life. Based on profound and timeless lessons, it is abundantly illustrated with examples of the genius and folly of everyone from Napoleon to Margaret Thatcher and Hannibal to Ulysses S. Grant, as well as diplomats, captains of industry and Samurai swordsmen.

Prevention is the key to effective policies in Africa, whether the issue is equitable resource exploitation, ethnic conflict, infectious diseases, or famine. African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have moved beyond their initial purpose of a loose confederation of trading partners to become increasingly effective supranational bodies promoting financial, political, and security stabilization in each of their regions. Looking at each of the RECs, their power centers, and areas of weakness, policymakers can gain a more comprehensive understanding of the sometimes symbiotic and often destructive dynamics within and among African states to seek more effective strategic and regional, not national, approaches. This monograph suggests USAFRICOM is uniquely positioned to help design a path to spearhead a pan-African strategy highly likely to have the net long-term effect of attaining considerable competitive advantage for the U.S. economically, militarily, and politically, with a corresponding increase in stability, security, and economic opportunity for the entire continent.

What happens if we bet too heavily on unmanned systems, cyber warfare, and special operations in our defense? In today's U.S. defense policy debates, big land wars are out. Drones, cyber weapons, special forces, and space weapons are in. Accordingly, Pentagon budget cuts have honed in on the army and ground forces: this, after the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, seems like an appealing idea. No one really wants American boots on the ground in bloody conflicts abroad. But it is not so easy to simply declare an end to messy land wars. A survey of the world's trouble spots suggests that land warfare has more of a future than

many now seem to believe. In *The Future of Land Warfare*, Michael O'Hanlon offers an analysis of the future of the world's ground forces: Where are large-scale conflicts or other catastrophes most plausible? Which of these could be important enough to require the option of a U.S. military response? And which of these could in turn demand significant numbers of American ground forces in their resolution? O'Hanlon is not predicting or advocating big American roles in such operations—only cautioning against overconfidence that we can and will avoid them. O'Hanlon considers a number of illustrative scenarios in which large conventional forces may be necessary: discouraging Russia from even contemplating attacks against the Baltic states; discouraging China from considering an unfriendly future role on the Korean peninsula; handling an asymmetric threat in the South China Sea with the construction and protection of a number of bases in the Philippines and elsewhere; managing the aftermath of a major and complex humanitarian disaster superimposed on a security crisis—perhaps in South Asia; coping with a severe Ebola outbreak not in the small states of West Africa but in Nigeria, at the same time that country falls further into violence; addressing a further meltdown in security conditions in Central America.

An informed modern plan for post-2020 American foreign policy that avoids the opposing dangers of retrenchment and overextension Russia and China are both believed to have “grand strategies”—detailed sets of national security goals backed by means, and plans, to pursue them. In the United States, policy makers have tried to articulate similar concepts but have failed to reach a widespread consensus since the Cold War ended. While the United States has been the world's prominent superpower for over a generation, much American thinking has oscillated between the extremes of isolationist agendas versus interventionist and overly assertive ones. Drawing on historical precedents and weighing issues such as Russia's resurgence, China's great rise, North Korea's nuclear machinations, and Middle East turmoil, Michael O'Hanlon presents a well-researched, ethically sound, and politically viable vision for American national security policy. He also proposes complementing the Pentagon's set of “4+1” pre-existing threats with a new “4+1”: biological, nuclear, digital, climatic, and internal dangers.

Pirates, warlords, guerillas, criminal organizations, drug cartels, apocalyptic religious extremists, police agencies, terrorists: these are classic insurgents whose past, present, and future is dissected in this important book. Contributing writers including Martha Crenshaw, T. X. Hammes, Russell Howard, Gene Cristy, Yosef Kuperwasser, and academics from Naval War College, Marine Corps War College, and Stanford University, explore important insurgency-related issues such as domestic terrorism, globalization of armed groups, children on the battlefield, religious influence on armed fights, and more. This rich anthology offers scholars and citizens a new way to think about national and international security—as it stands today, and its future.

Tame the Chaos introduces the reader to a revolutionary strategy and planning process. This groundbreaking model represents the first time the powerful aspects of systems-thinking, design-thinking, the newer models of leadership, and strategic communication have been combined with the innovative strategy and planning techniques used by the U.S. military today. *Tame the Chaos* teaches the reader to harness the energy from their complex, hectic, even frenzied environment as a means to better understand and reduce day-to-day turmoil. Doing so creates a more stable setting in which to operate, make decisions, and

progress towards strategic objectives. Using the scalable six steps of Tame the Chaos, a comprehensive strategy can be developed, and robust planning effort can be undertaken for any size organization. You are invited to read and use the concepts within. Soon, you will be able to actually Tame the Chaos and unleash the full potential of your organization through decisive action.

Failure and folly are inevitable in war and in security policy related to war. Technology cannot rescue flawed policy or strategy. In his review of U.S. military strategy, Cimbala points to the possibility that excessive faith in technology may lead American strategy into a cul-de-sac.

Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since September 11, few issues have been more hotly debated than the United States' role in the world. In this hard-nosed but sophisticated examination, Colin S. Gray argues that America is the indispensable guardian of world order. Gray's constructive critique of recent trends in national security is holistic, rooting defense issues and prospective answers both in U.S. national security policy, broadly defined, and in the emerging international security environment. Colin S. Gray is professor of international politics and strategic studies at the University of Reading, England, and senior fellow at the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia. He is the author of seventeen books, including *Modern Strategy* and *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History*.

With a rich comparative case-study approach that spans Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, *Building Militaries in Fragile States* unearths provocative findings that suggest the traditional way of working with foreign militaries needs to be rethought.

The publication of the 1982 version of Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, introduced to the English-speaking world the idea of an operational level of war encompassing the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations. It was followed 3 years later by the introduction of the term "operational art" which was, in practice, the skillful management of the operational level of war. This conception of an identifiably separate level of war that defined the jurisdiction of the profession of arms was, for a number of historical and cultural reasons, attractive to U.S. practitioners and plausible to its English-speaking allies. As a result, it and its associated doctrine spread rapidly around the world. The authors argue that as warfare continues to diffuse across definitional and conceptual boundaries and as the close orchestration of all of the instruments of national power becomes even more important, the current conception of campaigns and operations becomes crippling.

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