

Ambiguity Aversion In Game Theory Experimental Evidence

A comprehensive review of behavioral operations management that puts the focus on new and trending research in the field. The Handbook of Behavioral Operations offers a comprehensive resource that fills the gap in the behavioral operations management literature. This vital text highlights best practices in behavioral operations research and identifies the most current research directions and their applications. A volume in the Wiley Series in Operations Research and Management Science, this book contains contributions from an international panel of scholars from a wide variety of backgrounds who are conducting behavioral research. The handbook provides succinct tutorials on common methods used to conduct behavioral research, serves as a resource for current topics in behavioral operations research, and as a guide to the use of new research methods. The authors review the fundamental theories and offer frameworks from a psychological, systems dynamics, and behavioral economic standpoint. They provide a crucial grounding for behavioral operations as well as an entry point for new areas of behavioral research. The handbook also presents a variety of behavioral operations applications that focus on specific areas of study and includes a survey of current and future research needs. This important resource: Contains a summary of the methodological foundations and in-depth treatment of research best practices in behavioral research. Provides a comprehensive review of the research conducted over the past two decades in behavioral operations, including such classic topics as inventory management, supply chain contracting, forecasting, and competitive sourcing. Covers a wide-range of current topics and applications including supply chain risk, responsible and sustainable supply chain, health care operations, culture and trust. Connects existing bodies of behavioral operations literature with related fields, including psychology and economics. Provides a vision for future behavioral research in operations. Written for academicians within the operations management community as well as for behavioral researchers, The Handbook of Behavioral Operations offers a comprehensive resource for the study of how individuals make decisions in an operational context with contributions from experts in the field.

This first volume of The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis covers the opening topic found in this definitive introduction to the subject: the behavioral economics of risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity. It is an essential guide for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students seeking a concise and focused text on this important subject, and examines how the decision maker chooses his optimal action in the presence of risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity. This updated extract from Dharami's leading textbook allows the reader to pursue subsections of this vast and rapidly growing field and to tailor their reading to their specific interests in behavioural economics.

This book constitutes the refereed conference proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Intelligent Computing, ICIC 2013, held in Nanning, China, in July 2013. The 74 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions and are organized in topical sections on neural networks, nature inspired computing and optimization, cognitive science and computational neuroscience, knowledge discovery and data mining, evolutionary learning and genetic algorithms machine learning theory and methods, natural language processing and computational linguistics, fuzzy theory and models, soft computing, unsupervised and reinforced learning, intelligent computing in finance, intelligent computing in petri nets, intelligent data fusion and information security, virtual reality and computer interaction, intelligent computing in pattern recognition, intelligent computing in image processing, intelligent computing in robotics, complex systems theory and methods.

This volume presents 38 classic texts in formal epistemology, and strengthens the ties between research into this area of philosophy and its neighbouring intellectual disciplines. The editors provide introductions to five subsections: Bayesian Epistemology, Belief Change, Decision Theory, Interactive Epistemology and Epistemic Logic. 'Formal epistemology' is a term coined in the late 1990s for a new constellation of interests in philosophy, the origins of which are found in earlier works of epistemologists, philosophers of science and logicians. It addresses a growing agenda of problems concerning knowledge, belief, certainty, rationality, deliberation, decision, strategy, action and agent interaction – and it does so using methods from logic, probability, computability, decision and game theory. The volume also includes a thorough index and suggestions for further reading, and thus offers a complete teaching and research package for students as well as research scholars of formal epistemology, philosophy, logic, computer science, theoretical economics and cognitive psychology.

Presents research utilizing laboratory experimental methods in economics.

Decisions are made by individual humans-but also by corporations, plants, robots, and computer programs. The authors of this volume help initiate a powerful new comparative dimension for our analysis and application of decision making across an enormous range of intellectual enquiry.

Models and Experiments in Risk and Rationality presents original contributions to the areas of individual choice, experimental economics, operations and analysis, multiple criteria decision making, market uncertainty, game theory and social choice. The papers, which were presented at the FUR VI conference, are arranged to appear in order of increasing complexity of the decision environment or social context in which they situate themselves. The first section 'Psychological Aspects of Risk-Bearing', considers choice at the purely individual level and for the most part, free of any specific economic or social context. The second section examines individual choice within the classical expected utility approach while the third section works from a perspective that includes non-expected utility preferences over lotteries. Section four, 'Multiple Criteria Decision-Making Under Uncertainty', considers the more specialized but crucial context of uncertain choice involving tradeoffs between competing criteria -- a field which is becoming of increasing importance in applied decision analysis. The final two sections examine uncertain choice in social or group contexts.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 26th Australasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AI 2013, held in Dunedin, New Zealand, in December 2013. The 35 revised full papers and 19 revised short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 120 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections as agents; AI applications; cognitive modelling; computer vision; constraint satisfaction, search and optimisation; evolutionary computation; game playing; knowledge representation and reasoning; machine learning and data mining; natural language processing and information retrieval; planning and scheduling.

Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.

Developments in the use of game theory have impacted multiple fields and created opportunities for new applications. With the ubiquity of these developments, there is an increase in the overall utilization of this approach. Game Theory: Breakthroughs in Research and Practice contains a compendium of the latest academic material on the usage, strategies, and applications for implementing game theory across a variety of industries and fields. Including innovative studies on economics, military strategy, and political science, this multi-volume book is an ideal source for professionals, practitioners, graduate students, academics, and researchers interested in the applications of game theory.

Gamification is the use of game play mechanics for non-game applications (also known as "funware"), particularly consumer-oriented web and mobile sites, in order to encourage people to adopt the applications. It also strives to encourage users to engage in desired behaviors in connection with the applications. Gamification works by making technology more engaging, and by encouraging desired behaviors, taking advantage of humans' psychological predisposition to engage in gaming. The technique can encourage people to perform chores that they ordinarily consider boring, such as completing surveys, shopping, or reading web sites. This book is your ultimate resource for gamification. Here you will find the most up-to-date theory, examples, ideas, and much more. In easy to read chapters, with extensive references and links to get you to know all there is to know right away: Gamification, Gameplay, Funware, Website, Statistical survey, Facebook, Foursquare (social network), Gowalla, Progress bar, Virtual currency, Casual game, Customer engagement, Social networking service, Windows Phone 7, Buzzword, Behavioral economics, Behavioral analysis of markets, Economics of gambling, Neuroeconomics, Physioeconomics, Predictably Irrational, Outline of games, Classic Game Room, Computer-assisted gaming, Game clock, Game club, Gamer, Gen Con, Girl gamer, Lightning round, Linux gaming, Metagaming, N.O.V.A 2: The Hero Rises Again, Nordreich, Normal play convention, Northwest Pinball and Gameroom Show, Penny Arcade Expo, Profezia, Recreation in Second Life, TORCS, Yottaquest, Dynamic game difficulty balancing, Dynamic music, Emergent gameplay, Evolver (3D Avatar Web Portal), Game balance, Game design, Game mechanics, Gold sink, House rule, Impulse-based turn system, Kingmaker scenario, Lame duck (game design), Lusory attitude, MDA framework, Simultaneous action selection, Super Nintendo Emulator SE, .MDX, 21st Century Game Design, 3D modeling, Andrew Rollings and Ernest Adams on Game Design, The Art of Computer Game Design, Chris Crawford on Game Design, Context-sensitive user interface, Cutscene, Environment artist, First playable demo, Flip-screen, Game Design Workshop, Game Development Series, Head swap, HUD (video gaming), Interactive Narrative Design, Level design, Lightmap, List of books about video games, Loading screen, Ludonarrative, Open world, Palette swap, Password (video games), Pre-rendering, Replay value, Scripted sequence, Scrolling, Skybox (video games), Sprite (computer graphics), Streaming audio in video games, TecMagik, User-generated content, Video game music, Virtual finance, Warp zone, User: Bracton/Sandbox/Game theory, Double auction, Evolutionary game theory, Fixed point (mathematics), Game theory, Glossary of game theory, Open Options, Quantum game theory, Social software (social procedure), Airport problem, Algorithmic game theory, Algorithmic mechanism design, Ambiguity aversion, Auction theory, Aumann's agreement theorem, Axiom of projective determinacy, Backward induction, Bankruptcy problem, Banzhaf power index, Bargaining problem, Battle of the sexes (game theory), Bayesian efficiency, Bayesian game, Beer distribution game, Bertrand competition, Bertrand paradox (economics), Best response, Blotto games, Bondareva-Shapley theorem, Bounded rationality, Braess's paradox, CC-PP game, Centipede game, Chainstore paradox, Cheap talk, Chicken (game), Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium, Collusion, Common knowledge (logic), Competitive altruism, Complete information, Complete mixing, The Complexity of Cooperation, Compromise, Congestion game, Consensus dynamics, Contingent cooperator, ..and much more.. Contains selected content from the highest rated entries, typeset, printed and shipped, combining the advantages of up-to-date and in-depth knowledge with the convenience of printed books. A portion of the proceeds of each book will be donated to the Wikimedia Foundation to support their mission.

"My dissertation consists of two essays: the first essay studies infinitely repeated games in which discount factors can depend on actions; the second essay studies efficient implementation in a single object allocation problem in which valuations are interdependent and agents are ambiguity aversion. The broad theme is to investigate how standard results in the study of game theory need to be modified when we allow for non-standard preferences. The first chapter studies infinitely repeated games in which the players' rates of time preference may evolve over time, depending on what transpires in the game. A key result is that in any first best equilibrium of the repeated prisoners' dilemma, the players must eventually cooperate. If we assume that the players become more patient as they obtain better outcomes, we show that cooperation prevails from the beginning of the game and is thus the unique outcome of any first best equilibrium. The latter result is suitably extended to all symmetric two player games. A separate contribution is to propose a framework in which intertemporal trade can emerge as a first best equilibrium of a repeated strategic interaction, generating predictions that differ from those in the standard framework. The second chapter considers a single object allocation problem with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations. When agents' signals are statistically independent, Jehiel and Moldovanu [42] show that efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms generally do not exist. In this paper, we extend the standard model to accommodate maxmin agents and obtain necessary as well as sufficient conditions under which efficient allocations can be implemented. In particular, we derive a condition that quantifies the amount of ambiguity necessary for efficient implementation. We further show that under some natural assumptions on the preferences, this necessary amount of ambiguity becomes sufficient. Finally, we provide a definition of informational size such that given any nontrivial amount of ambiguity, efficient allocations can be implemented if agents are sufficiently informationally small."--Pages vii-viii.

This handbook in two parts covers key topics of the theory of financial decision making. Some of the papers discuss real applications or case studies as well. There are a number of new papers that have never been published before especially in Part II. Part I is concerned with Decision Making Under Uncertainty. This includes subsections on Arbitrage, Utility Theory, Risk Aversion and Static Portfolio Theory, and Stochastic Dominance. Part II is concerned with Dynamic Modeling that is the transition for static decision making to multiperiod decision making. The analysis starts with Risk Measures and then discusses Dynamic Portfolio Theory, Tactical Asset Allocation and Asset-Liability Management Using Utility and Goal Based Consumption-Investment Decision Models. A comprehensive set of problems both computational and review and mind expanding with many unsolved problems are in an accompanying problems book. The handbook plus the book of problems form a very strong set of materials for PhD and Masters courses both as the main or as supplementary text in finance theory, financial decision making and portfolio theory. For researchers, it is a valuable resource being an up to date treatment of topics in the classic books on these topics by Johnathan Ingersoll in 1988, and William Ziemba and Raymond Vickson in 1975 (updated 2nd edition published in 2006).

The award-winning The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition is now available as a dynamic online resource. Consisting of over 1,900 articles written by leading figures in the field including Nobel prize winners, this is the definitive scholarly reference work for a new generation of economists. Regularly updated! This product is a subscription based product.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2021, held in October 2021. Due to COVID-19 pandemic the conference was held virtually. The 20 full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 37 submissions. The papers focus on Theoretical Foundations in Equilibrium Computation; Machine Learning and Game Theory; Ransomware; Cyber-Physical Systems Security; Innovations in Attacks and Defenses.

This work, a paradigm for modelling decision-making under uncertainty, describes the general theory and its relationship to planning, repeated choice problems, inductive inference, and learning; and highlights its mathematical and philosophical foundations.

From a pioneer in experimental economics, an expanded and updated edition of a textbook that brings economic experiments into the classroom Economics is rapidly becoming a more experimental science, and the best way to convey insights from this research is to engage students in classroom simulations that motivate subsequent discussions and reading. In this expanded and updated second edition of Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Charles Holt, one of the leaders in experimental economics, provides an unparalleled introduction to the study of economic behavior, organized around risky decisions, games of strategy, and economic markets that can be simulated in class. Each chapter is based on a key experiment, presented with accessible examples and just enough theory. Featuring innovative applications from the lab and the field, the book introduces new research on a wide range of topics. Core chapters provide an introduction to the experimental analysis of markets and strategic decisions made in the shadow of risk or conflict. Instructors can then pick and choose among topics focused on bargaining, game theory, social preferences, industrial organization, public choice and voting, asset market bubbles, and auctions. Based on decades of teaching experience, this is the perfect book for any undergraduate course in experimental economics or behavioral game theory. New material on topics such as matching, belief elicitation, repeated games, prospect theory, probabilistic choice, macro experiments, and statistical analysis Participatory experiments that connect behavioral theory and laboratory research Largely self-contained chapters that can each be covered in a single class Guidance for instructors on setting up classroom experiments, with either hand-run procedures or free online software End-of-chapter problems, including some conceptual-design questions, with hints or partial solutions provided

Prospect Theory: For Risk and Ambiguity, provides a comprehensive and accessible textbook treatment of the way decisions are made both when we have the statistical probabilities associated with uncertain future events (risk) and when we lack them (ambiguity). The book presents models, primarily prospect theory, that are both tractable and psychologically realistic. A method of presentation is chosen that makes the empirical meaning of each theoretical model completely transparent. Prospect theory has many applications in a wide variety of disciplines. The material in the book has been carefully organized to allow readers to select pathways through the book relevant to their own interests. With numerous exercises and worked examples, the book is ideally suited to the needs of students taking courses in decision theory in economics, mathematics, finance, psychology, management science, health, computer science, Bayesian statistics, and engineering.

This textbook looks at decisions – how we make them, and what makes them good or bad. In this bestselling introduction, Erik Angner clearly lays out the theory of behavioral economics and explains the intuitions behind it. The book offers a rich tapestry of examples, exercises, and problems drawn from fields such as economics, management, marketing, political science, and public policy. It shows how to apply the principles of behavioral economics to improve your life and work – and to make the world a better place to boot. No advanced mathematics is required. This is an ideal textbook for students coming to behavioral economics from various fields. It can be used on its own in introductory courses, or in combination with other texts at advanced undergraduate and postgraduate levels. It is equally suitable for general readers who have been captivated by popular-science books on behavioral economics and want to know more about this intriguing subject. New to this Edition: - An updated chapter on behavioral policy and the nudge agenda. - Several new sections, for example on the economics of happiness. - Updated examples and exercises, with an expanded answer key - Refreshed ancillary resources make for a plug and play experience for instructors teaching behavioral economics for the first time.

Uncertain Decisions: Bridging Theory and Experiments presents advanced directions of thinking on decision theory - in particular the more recent contributions on non-expected utility theory, fuzzy decision theory and case-based theory. This work also provides theoretical insights on measures of risk aversion and on new problems for general equilibrium analysis. It analyzes how the thinking that underlies the theories described above spills over into real decisions, and how the thinking that underlies these real decisions can explain the discrepancies between theoretical approaches and actual behavior. This work elaborates on how the most recent laboratory experiments have become an important source both for evaluating the leading theory of choice and decision, and for contributing to the formation of new models regarding the subject.

Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business, political science, and the law. Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business, political science, and the law. Strategies and Games grew out of Prajit Dutta's experience teaching a course in game theory over the last six years at Columbia University. The book is divided into three parts: Strategic Form Games and Their Applications, Extensive Form Games and Their Applications, and Asymmetric Information Games and Their Applications. The theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, backward induction, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated games, dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, and signaling. An appendix presents a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, as well as the optimization and probability theory required for the course. Every chapter that introduces a new theoretical concept opens with examples and ends with a case study. Case studies include Global Warming and the Internet, Poison Pills, Treasury Bill Auctions, and Final Jeopardy. Each part of the book also contains several chapter-length applications including Bankruptcy Law, the NASDAQ market, OPEC, and the Commons problem. This is also the first text to provide a detailed analysis of dynamic strategic interaction.

The Handbook of Risk Theory provides a state-of-the-art overview of the epistemological, decision theoretical, ethical and social aspects of Risk. This is the first handbook on the topic written from a philosophical perspective, yet also addresses an interdisciplinary audience.

This volume brings together important papers, coupled with new introductions, in the massively influential area of uncertainty in economic theory. Seminal papers are available together for the first time in book format, with new introductions and under the steely editorship of Itzhak Gilboa - this book is a useful reference tool for economists all over the globe.

Decision makers strive to be rational. Traditionally, rational decisions maximize an appropriate return. The contributors to this book challenge the common assumption that good decisions must be rational in this economic sense. They emphasize that the decision-making process is influenced by social, organizational, and psychological considerations as well as by economic concerns. Relationships, time pressure, external demands for specific types of performance, contractual expectations, human biases, and reactions to unfair treatment alter the decision-making context and the resulting decision outcomes.

The need to understand the theories and applications of economic and finance risk has been clear to everyone since the financial crisis, and this collection of original essays proffers broad, high-level explanations of risk and uncertainty. The economics of risk and uncertainty is unlike most branches of economics in spanning from the individual decision-maker to the market (and indeed, social decisions), and ranging from purely theoretical analysis through individual experimentation, empirical analysis, and applied and policy decisions. It also has close and sometimes conflicting relationships with theoretical and applied statistics, and psychology. The aim of this volume is to provide an overview of diverse aspects of this field, ranging from classical and foundational work through current developments. Presents coherent summaries of risk and uncertainty that inform major areas in economics and finance Divides coverage between theoretical, empirical, and experimental findings Makes the economics of risk and uncertainty accessible to scholars in fields outside economics

There is an enhanced level of connectivity available in modern society through the increased usage of various technological devices. Such developments have led to the integration of smart objects into the Internet of Things (IoT), an emerging paradigm in the digital age. Game Theory Solutions for the Internet of Things: Emerging Research and Opportunities examines the latest strategies for the management of IoT systems and the application of theoretical models to enhance real-world applications and improve system efficiency. Highlighting innovative algorithms and methods, as well as coverage on cloud computing, cross-domain applications, and energy control, this book is a pivotal source of information for researchers, practitioners, graduate students, professionals, and academics interested in the game theoretic solutions for IoT applications.

Social simulation can be a difficult discipline to encompass fully. There are many methods, models, directions, and theories that can be discussed and applied to various social sciences. Anthropology, sociology, political science, economy, government, and management can all benefit from social simulation. Interdisciplinary Applications of Agent-Based Social Simulation and Modeling aims to bring a different perspective to this interdisciplinary topic. This book presents current discussions and new insights on social simulation as a whole, focusing on its dangers, pitfalls, deceptions, and challenges. This book is an essential reference for researchers in this field, professionals using social simulation, and even students studying this discipline.

This volume contains 14 essays on seminal topics in economic analysis by internationally renowned scholars.

Gain some insight into the game of life... Game Theory means rigorous strategic thinking. It is based on the idea that everyone acts competitively and in his own best interest. With the help of mathematical models, it is possible to anticipate the actions of others in nearly all life's enterprises. This book includes down-to-earth examples and solutions, as well as charts and illustrations designed to help teach the concept. In *The Complete Idiot's Guide® to Game Theory*, Dr. Edward C. Rosenthal makes it easy to understand game theory with insights into: ? The history of the discipline made popular by John Nash, the mathematician dramatized in the film *A Beautiful Mind* ? The role of social behavior and psychology in this amazing discipline ? How important game theory has become in our society and why

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 25th Australasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AI 2012, held in Sydney, Australia, in December 2012. The 76 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 196 submissions. The papers address a wide range of agents, applications, computer vision, constraints and search, game playing, information retrieval, knowledge representation, machine learning, planning and scheduling, robotics and uncertainty in AI.

The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics

Uncertain Decisions Bridging Theory and Experiments Springer Science & Business Media

Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose. Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.

"Law and economics casebook for law school students enrolled in a law and economics class"--

This is the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics aimed at advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. Authoritative, cutting edge, yet accessible, it guides the reader through theory and evidence, providing engaging and relevant applications throughout. It is divided into nine parts and 24 chapters: Part I is on behavioral economics of risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity. The evidence against expected utility theory is examined, and the behavioral response is outlined; the best empirically supported theory is prospect theory. Part II considers other-regarding preferences. The evidence from experimental games on human sociality is given, followed by models and applications of inequity aversion, intentions based reciprocity, conditional cooperation, human virtues, and social identity. Part III is on time discounting. It considers the evidence against the exponential discounted utility model and describes several behavioral models such as hyperbolic discounting, attribute based models and the reference time theory. Part IV describes the evidence on classical game theory and considers several models of behavioral game theory, including level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, quantal response equilibrium,

and psychological game theory. Part V considers behavioral models of learning that include evolutionary game theory, classical models of learning, experience weighted attraction model, learning direction theory, and stochastic social dynamics. Part VI studies the role of emotions; among other topics it considers projection bias, temptation preferences, happiness economics, and interaction between emotions and cognition. Part VII considers bounded rationality. The three main topics considered are judgment heuristics and biases, mental accounting, and behavioral finance. Part VIII considers behavioral welfare economics; the main topics are soft paternalism, and choice-based measures of welfare. Finally, Part IX gives an abbreviated taster course in neuroeconomics.

Experimental Business Research includes papers that were presented at the First Asian Conference on Experimental Business Research held at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), on December 7-10, 1999. The conference was organized by the Center for Experimental Business Research (cEBR) at the HKUST. The papers presented at the conference and a few others that were solicited especially for this volume contain original research on individual and interactive decision behavior in various branches of business research including, but not limited to, economics, marketing, management, finance, and accounting. Experimental Business Research is suitable as a secondary text for a graduate level course, and as a reference for researchers and practitioners in industry.

Whether we like it or not we all feel that the world is uncertain. From choosing a new technology to selecting a job, we rarely know in advance what outcome will result from our decisions. Unfortunately, the standard theory of choice under uncertainty developed in the early forties and fifties turns out to be too rigid to take many tricky issues of choice under uncertainty into account. The good news is that we have now moved away from the early descriptively inadequate modeling of behavior. This book brings the reader into contact with the accomplished progress in individual decision making through the most recent contributions to uncertainty modeling and behavioral decision making. It also introduces the reader into the many subtle issues to be resolved for rational choice under uncertainty.

[Copyright: 75b0f9e4033706e5f09bfd369ec37e5f](#)